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The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB)

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The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB). / Holland, Alan John.
In: Bioethics, Vol. 30, No. 7, 09.2016, p. 490-499.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Holland, AJ 2016, 'The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB)', Bioethics, vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 490-499. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12253

APA

Holland, A. J. (2016). The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB). Bioethics, 30(7), 490-499. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12253

Vancouver

Holland AJ. The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB). Bioethics. 2016 Sept;30(7):490-499. Epub 2016 Mar 22. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12253

Author

Holland, Alan John. / The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB). In: Bioethics. 2016 ; Vol. 30, No. 7. pp. 490-499.

Bibtex

@article{0b6492c2dc0c4e0b8927f10d75667fc9,
title = "The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB)",
abstract = "Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence (PB) states that, other things being equal, and of the possible children they could have, a couple contemplating procreation are morally obliged to (attempt to) procreate the child with the best chance of the best life. The critique of PB is in three parts. The first part argues that PB rests on a particular conception of the good life, and that alternative conceptions of the good life afford no obvious way in which PB can be rendered operational. The second part identifies six flaws in the attempt to justify PB in terms of a particular conception of the good life according to which the best life is understood as the life with the most well-being. The third part explores some of the uncertainties that surround the potential implications and ramifications of adopting the principle. The overall purpose is not to demonstrate that the principle is untenable, but only to demonstrate that no compelling reason has yet been given for adhering to it.",
author = "Holland, {Alan John}",
year = "2016",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1111/bioe.12253",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "490--499",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "7",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The case against the case for Procreative Beneficence (PB)

AU - Holland, Alan John

PY - 2016/9

Y1 - 2016/9

N2 - Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence (PB) states that, other things being equal, and of the possible children they could have, a couple contemplating procreation are morally obliged to (attempt to) procreate the child with the best chance of the best life. The critique of PB is in three parts. The first part argues that PB rests on a particular conception of the good life, and that alternative conceptions of the good life afford no obvious way in which PB can be rendered operational. The second part identifies six flaws in the attempt to justify PB in terms of a particular conception of the good life according to which the best life is understood as the life with the most well-being. The third part explores some of the uncertainties that surround the potential implications and ramifications of adopting the principle. The overall purpose is not to demonstrate that the principle is untenable, but only to demonstrate that no compelling reason has yet been given for adhering to it.

AB - Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence (PB) states that, other things being equal, and of the possible children they could have, a couple contemplating procreation are morally obliged to (attempt to) procreate the child with the best chance of the best life. The critique of PB is in three parts. The first part argues that PB rests on a particular conception of the good life, and that alternative conceptions of the good life afford no obvious way in which PB can be rendered operational. The second part identifies six flaws in the attempt to justify PB in terms of a particular conception of the good life according to which the best life is understood as the life with the most well-being. The third part explores some of the uncertainties that surround the potential implications and ramifications of adopting the principle. The overall purpose is not to demonstrate that the principle is untenable, but only to demonstrate that no compelling reason has yet been given for adhering to it.

U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12253

DO - 10.1111/bioe.12253

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 490

EP - 499

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

IS - 7

ER -