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The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights

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The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights. / Smith, Leonie.
In: Journal of Social Ontology, Vol. 4, No. 1, 22.02.2018.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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@article{f0757c6885c24378b7e317570b8c17c8,
title = "The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald{\textquoteright}s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights",
abstract = "Performative accounts of personhood argue that group agents are persons, fit to be held responsible within the social sphere. Nonetheless, these accounts want to retain a moral distinction between group and individual persons. That: (1) Group-persons can be responsible for their actions qua persons, but that (2) group-persons might nonetheless not have rights equivalent to those of human persons. I present an argument which makes sense of this disanalogy, without recourse to normative claims or additional ontological commitments. I instead ground rights in the different relations in which performative persons stand in relation to one another.",
keywords = "Group personhood, Group rights, Social ontology, Arbitrary power, Personhood, Agency",
author = "Leonie Smith",
note = "Winner of the 2016 Essay Competition of the International Social Ontology Society",
year = "2018",
month = feb,
day = "22",
doi = "10.1515/jso-2016-0042",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
journal = "Journal of Social Ontology",
issn = "2196-9663",
publisher = "De Gruyter",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights

AU - Smith, Leonie

N1 - Winner of the 2016 Essay Competition of the International Social Ontology Society

PY - 2018/2/22

Y1 - 2018/2/22

N2 - Performative accounts of personhood argue that group agents are persons, fit to be held responsible within the social sphere. Nonetheless, these accounts want to retain a moral distinction between group and individual persons. That: (1) Group-persons can be responsible for their actions qua persons, but that (2) group-persons might nonetheless not have rights equivalent to those of human persons. I present an argument which makes sense of this disanalogy, without recourse to normative claims or additional ontological commitments. I instead ground rights in the different relations in which performative persons stand in relation to one another.

AB - Performative accounts of personhood argue that group agents are persons, fit to be held responsible within the social sphere. Nonetheless, these accounts want to retain a moral distinction between group and individual persons. That: (1) Group-persons can be responsible for their actions qua persons, but that (2) group-persons might nonetheless not have rights equivalent to those of human persons. I present an argument which makes sense of this disanalogy, without recourse to normative claims or additional ontological commitments. I instead ground rights in the different relations in which performative persons stand in relation to one another.

KW - Group personhood

KW - Group rights

KW - Social ontology

KW - Arbitrary power

KW - Personhood

KW - Agency

U2 - 10.1515/jso-2016-0042

DO - 10.1515/jso-2016-0042

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

JO - Journal of Social Ontology

JF - Journal of Social Ontology

SN - 2196-9663

IS - 1

ER -