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The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions. / Abbott, Andrew; Jones, Philip.
In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 03.04.2023, p. 209-228.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Abbott, A & Jones, P 2023, 'The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions', Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 209-228. https://doi.org/10.1080/21606544.2022.2110162

APA

Abbott, A., & Jones, P. (2023). The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions. Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 12(2), 209-228. https://doi.org/10.1080/21606544.2022.2110162

Vancouver

Abbott A, Jones P. The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions. Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy. 2023 Apr 3;12(2):209-228. Epub 2022 Aug 29. doi: 10.1080/21606544.2022.2110162

Author

Abbott, Andrew ; Jones, Philip. / The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure : political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy. 2023 ; Vol. 12, No. 2. pp. 209-228.

Bibtex

@article{3f4b36b0e2be481e82bc31820f460aad,
title = "The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions",
abstract = "This is the first paper to explore the determinants of the cyclicality of government environmental protection expenditures. Attention focuses on political pressures to increase expenditure on public-sector programmes. These pressures change systematically over the economic cycle. In economic upturns, voters experience {\textquoteleft}fiscal illusion{\textquoteright}. Governments can exercise discretion to increase environmental expenditures. In recessions, voters are far more aware. Vote maximising governments divert expenditures away from the environment, toward programmes that deliver more private-good benefits. Predictions are tested with reference to 28 OECD countries{\textquoteright} expenditures between 1992 and 2012. The cyclicality of expenditures depends on government sensitivity to systematic changes in voter awareness.",
keywords = "Government expenditurenvoracity effects, environmental protection, fiscal illusion, voracity effects",
author = "Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones",
year = "2023",
month = apr,
day = "3",
doi = "10.1080/21606544.2022.2110162",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "209--228",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy",
issn = "2160-6544",
publisher = "Informa UK Limited",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure

T2 - political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions

AU - Abbott, Andrew

AU - Jones, Philip

PY - 2023/4/3

Y1 - 2023/4/3

N2 - This is the first paper to explore the determinants of the cyclicality of government environmental protection expenditures. Attention focuses on political pressures to increase expenditure on public-sector programmes. These pressures change systematically over the economic cycle. In economic upturns, voters experience ‘fiscal illusion’. Governments can exercise discretion to increase environmental expenditures. In recessions, voters are far more aware. Vote maximising governments divert expenditures away from the environment, toward programmes that deliver more private-good benefits. Predictions are tested with reference to 28 OECD countries’ expenditures between 1992 and 2012. The cyclicality of expenditures depends on government sensitivity to systematic changes in voter awareness.

AB - This is the first paper to explore the determinants of the cyclicality of government environmental protection expenditures. Attention focuses on political pressures to increase expenditure on public-sector programmes. These pressures change systematically over the economic cycle. In economic upturns, voters experience ‘fiscal illusion’. Governments can exercise discretion to increase environmental expenditures. In recessions, voters are far more aware. Vote maximising governments divert expenditures away from the environment, toward programmes that deliver more private-good benefits. Predictions are tested with reference to 28 OECD countries’ expenditures between 1992 and 2012. The cyclicality of expenditures depends on government sensitivity to systematic changes in voter awareness.

KW - Government expenditurenvoracity effects

KW - environmental protection

KW - fiscal illusion

KW - voracity effects

U2 - 10.1080/21606544.2022.2110162

DO - 10.1080/21606544.2022.2110162

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 209

EP - 228

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy

SN - 2160-6544

IS - 2

ER -