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The ‘David’ in a Divided Gulf: Qatar's Foreign Policy and the 2017 Gulf Crisis

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The ‘David’ in a Divided Gulf: Qatar's Foreign Policy and the 2017 Gulf Crisis. / Al-Eshaq, Saoud ; Rasheed, Amjed.
In: Middle East Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, 31.08.2022, p. 30-45.

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Al-Eshaq S, Rasheed A. The ‘David’ in a Divided Gulf: Qatar's Foreign Policy and the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Middle East Policy. 2022 Aug 31;29(2):30-45. Epub 2022 May 4. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12623

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Al-Eshaq, Saoud ; Rasheed, Amjed. / The ‘David’ in a Divided Gulf: Qatar's Foreign Policy and the 2017 Gulf Crisis. In: Middle East Policy. 2022 ; Vol. 29, No. 2. pp. 30-45.

Bibtex

@article{e2fea784b8864201842caa6646331a0a,
title = "The {\textquoteleft}David{\textquoteright} in a Divided Gulf: Qatar's Foreign Policy and the 2017 Gulf Crisis",
abstract = "This article analyzes how Qatar strategically utilized its foreign policy to overcome the implications of the 2017 Gulf crisis. Using neoclassical realism, it investigates the ways in which Qatar used its foreign relations to mitigate the impact of a crisis that barred Qatar from aerial, naval, and land corridors in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, henceforth referred to as the Quartet. The impacts are threefold. Starting from a macro-level perspective, Qatar leveraged its status as a crucial energy supplier, alongside the resultant financial boon, to prevent an international consensus supporting the claims of the Quartet. From a micro-level perspective, the likelihood of military escalation was circumvented by Qatar's ties with Turkey and the United States. Finally, the economic impact of the crisis was largely absorbed by Qatar's ties with Iran.",
author = "Saoud Al-Eshaq and Amjed Rasheed",
year = "2022",
month = aug,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1111/mepo.12623",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "30--45",
journal = "Middle East Policy",
issn = "1061-1924",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The ‘David’ in a Divided Gulf: Qatar's Foreign Policy and the 2017 Gulf Crisis

AU - Al-Eshaq, Saoud

AU - Rasheed, Amjed

PY - 2022/8/31

Y1 - 2022/8/31

N2 - This article analyzes how Qatar strategically utilized its foreign policy to overcome the implications of the 2017 Gulf crisis. Using neoclassical realism, it investigates the ways in which Qatar used its foreign relations to mitigate the impact of a crisis that barred Qatar from aerial, naval, and land corridors in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, henceforth referred to as the Quartet. The impacts are threefold. Starting from a macro-level perspective, Qatar leveraged its status as a crucial energy supplier, alongside the resultant financial boon, to prevent an international consensus supporting the claims of the Quartet. From a micro-level perspective, the likelihood of military escalation was circumvented by Qatar's ties with Turkey and the United States. Finally, the economic impact of the crisis was largely absorbed by Qatar's ties with Iran.

AB - This article analyzes how Qatar strategically utilized its foreign policy to overcome the implications of the 2017 Gulf crisis. Using neoclassical realism, it investigates the ways in which Qatar used its foreign relations to mitigate the impact of a crisis that barred Qatar from aerial, naval, and land corridors in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, henceforth referred to as the Quartet. The impacts are threefold. Starting from a macro-level perspective, Qatar leveraged its status as a crucial energy supplier, alongside the resultant financial boon, to prevent an international consensus supporting the claims of the Quartet. From a micro-level perspective, the likelihood of military escalation was circumvented by Qatar's ties with Turkey and the United States. Finally, the economic impact of the crisis was largely absorbed by Qatar's ties with Iran.

U2 - 10.1111/mepo.12623

DO - 10.1111/mepo.12623

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 30

EP - 45

JO - Middle East Policy

JF - Middle East Policy

SN - 1061-1924

IS - 2

ER -