Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > The demand commitment bargaining and snowballin...

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation. / Winter, E.
In: Economic Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, 03.1994, p. 255-273.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 1994, 'The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation', Economic Theory, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 255-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01221203

APA

Winter, E. (1994). The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation. Economic Theory, 4(2), 255-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01221203

Vancouver

Winter E. The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation. Economic Theory. 1994 Mar;4(2):255-273. doi: 10.1007/BF01221203

Author

Winter, E. / The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation. In: Economic Theory. 1994 ; Vol. 4, No. 2. pp. 255-273.

Bibtex

@article{69d60c75ddcf4585ac4848e606f55c4b,
title = "The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation",
abstract = "A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption. {\textcopyright} 1994 Springer-Verlag.",
keywords = "Economic Theory , Main Tool , Good Consumption , Payoff Distribution , Bargaining Model ",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "1994",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1007/BF01221203",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "255--273",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1994/3

Y1 - 1994/3

N2 - A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption. © 1994 Springer-Verlag.

AB - A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption. © 1994 Springer-Verlag.

KW - Economic Theory

KW - Main Tool

KW - Good Consumption

KW - Payoff Distribution

KW - Bargaining Model

U2 - 10.1007/BF01221203

DO - 10.1007/BF01221203

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 255

EP - 273

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 2

ER -