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The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies

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The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies. / Conyon, Martin; Mallin, C; Sadler, G.

In: Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2002, p. 95-103.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M, Mallin, C & Sadler, G 2002, 'The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies', Applied Financial Economics, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 95-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100110088076

APA

Conyon, M., Mallin, C., & Sadler, G. (2002). The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2), 95-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100110088076

Vancouver

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Mallin, C ; Sadler, G. / The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies. In: Applied Financial Economics. 2002 ; Vol. 12, No. 2. pp. 95-103.

Bibtex

@article{0c608bcdca514b2ea4df0e5767d638c3,
title = "The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies",
abstract = "This paper considers the empirical determinants of the quality of information disclosed about directors' share options in a sample of large companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of director option information. In this paper two modest contributions to the UK empirical literature are made. First, the current degree of option information disclosure in the FTSE 350 companies is documented. Second, option information disclosure as a function of variables that are thought to influence corporate costs of disclosure is modelled. The results have implications for corporate governance. Specifically, support is offered for the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors. In addition, nondisclosure is found to be related to variables which proxy proprietary costs of revealing information (such as company size).",
author = "Martin Conyon and C Mallin and G Sadler",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1080/09603100110088076",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "95--103",
journal = "Applied Financial Economics",
issn = "0960-3107",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Disclosure of Directors Share Option Information in UK Companies

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Mallin, C

AU - Sadler, G

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - This paper considers the empirical determinants of the quality of information disclosed about directors' share options in a sample of large companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of director option information. In this paper two modest contributions to the UK empirical literature are made. First, the current degree of option information disclosure in the FTSE 350 companies is documented. Second, option information disclosure as a function of variables that are thought to influence corporate costs of disclosure is modelled. The results have implications for corporate governance. Specifically, support is offered for the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors. In addition, nondisclosure is found to be related to variables which proxy proprietary costs of revealing information (such as company size).

AB - This paper considers the empirical determinants of the quality of information disclosed about directors' share options in a sample of large companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of director option information. In this paper two modest contributions to the UK empirical literature are made. First, the current degree of option information disclosure in the FTSE 350 companies is documented. Second, option information disclosure as a function of variables that are thought to influence corporate costs of disclosure is modelled. The results have implications for corporate governance. Specifically, support is offered for the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors. In addition, nondisclosure is found to be related to variables which proxy proprietary costs of revealing information (such as company size).

U2 - 10.1080/09603100110088076

DO - 10.1080/09603100110088076

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 95

EP - 103

JO - Applied Financial Economics

JF - Applied Financial Economics

SN - 0960-3107

IS - 2

ER -