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The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market. / Buraimo, Babatunde; Frick, Bernd; Hickfang, Michael et al.
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62, No. 1, 02.2015, p. 8-24.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Buraimo, B, Frick, B, Hickfang, M & Simmons, R 2015, 'The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 8-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12064

APA

Buraimo, B., Frick, B., Hickfang, M., & Simmons, R. (2015). The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 62(1), 8-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12064

Vancouver

Buraimo B, Frick B, Hickfang M, Simmons R. The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2015 Feb;62(1):8-24. Epub 2015 Jan 13. doi: 10.1111/sjpe.12064

Author

Buraimo, Babatunde ; Frick, Bernd ; Hickfang, Michael et al. / The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market. In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2015 ; Vol. 62, No. 1. pp. 8-24.

Bibtex

@article{f3863c6d2e9b4c49b70ea4c9dd983a80,
title = "The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market",
abstract = "Peter Sloane's seminal article in this journal on the objectives of football clubs argued that utility maximising clubs would seek out player talent more aggressively than profit maximising clubs and that this accumulation of player talent by larger teams might need to be checked by redistribution of revenues. We suggest in this article that, in a context of rising revenues and high rewards, the pressures to acquire more and better talent so as to out-perform other teams on the football pitch leads to a requirement for teams to practise effective contract management. Using a large dataset from the German Bundesliga, we find that players with longer term contracts perform better, ceteris paribus. Hence, selection effects in the award of long-term contracts dominate moral hazard (shirking) effects in the Bundesliga.",
author = "Babatunde Buraimo and Bernd Frick and Michael Hickfang and Robert Simmons",
year = "2015",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1111/sjpe.12064",
language = "English",
volume = "62",
pages = "8--24",
journal = "Scottish Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0036-9292",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers' labour market

AU - Buraimo, Babatunde

AU - Frick, Bernd

AU - Hickfang, Michael

AU - Simmons, Robert

PY - 2015/2

Y1 - 2015/2

N2 - Peter Sloane's seminal article in this journal on the objectives of football clubs argued that utility maximising clubs would seek out player talent more aggressively than profit maximising clubs and that this accumulation of player talent by larger teams might need to be checked by redistribution of revenues. We suggest in this article that, in a context of rising revenues and high rewards, the pressures to acquire more and better talent so as to out-perform other teams on the football pitch leads to a requirement for teams to practise effective contract management. Using a large dataset from the German Bundesliga, we find that players with longer term contracts perform better, ceteris paribus. Hence, selection effects in the award of long-term contracts dominate moral hazard (shirking) effects in the Bundesliga.

AB - Peter Sloane's seminal article in this journal on the objectives of football clubs argued that utility maximising clubs would seek out player talent more aggressively than profit maximising clubs and that this accumulation of player talent by larger teams might need to be checked by redistribution of revenues. We suggest in this article that, in a context of rising revenues and high rewards, the pressures to acquire more and better talent so as to out-perform other teams on the football pitch leads to a requirement for teams to practise effective contract management. Using a large dataset from the German Bundesliga, we find that players with longer term contracts perform better, ceteris paribus. Hence, selection effects in the award of long-term contracts dominate moral hazard (shirking) effects in the Bundesliga.

U2 - 10.1111/sjpe.12064

DO - 10.1111/sjpe.12064

M3 - Journal article

VL - 62

SP - 8

EP - 24

JO - Scottish Journal of Political Economy

JF - Scottish Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0036-9292

IS - 1

ER -