Rights statement: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-and-comparative-law-quarterly/article/elusive-right-to-truth-in-transitional-human-rights-jurisprudence/4A03D1909674ED805CB1434631E54E94 The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 67 (2), pp 353-387 2018, © 2018 Cambridge University Press.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
| <mark>Journal publication date</mark> | 1/04/2018 |
|---|---|
| <mark>Journal</mark> | International and Comparative Law Quarterly |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Number of pages | 35 |
| Pages (from-to) | 353-387 |
| Publication Status | Published |
| Early online date | 12/12/17 |
| <mark>Original language</mark> | English |
This article undertakes a comparative legal analysis of the scope of an emerging legal duty to find the truth about historical human rights abuses after periods of political transition. There is substantial inconsistency between human rights regimes on how they establish temporal jurisdiction in their transitional jurisprudence, which has not yet been systematically investigated. This contribution fills the gap in the literature by identifying and critiquing the way in which the right to truth in times of transition is both expressly and implicitly vindicated in the decisions of the Human Rights Committee, and the regional jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights (the conclusion also addresses the less voluminous African regional jurisprudence). It is argued that the 'underlying values' of human rights treaties can provide a foundation for a powerful but finite right to truth.