Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - The fail-heterogeneous architectural model
AU - Serafini, M.
AU - Suri, Neeraj
PY - 2007/10/10
Y1 - 2007/10/10
N2 - Fault tolerant distributed protocols typically utilize a homogeneous fault model, either fail-crash or fail-Byzantine, where all processors are assumed to fail in the same manner. In practice, due to complexity and evolvability reasons, only a subset of the nodes can actually be designed to have a restricted, fail-crash failure mode, provided that they are free of design faults. Based on this consideration, we propose a fail-heterogeneous architectural model for distributed systems which considers two classes of nodes: (a) full-fledged execution nodes, which can be fail-Byzantine, and (b) lightweight, validated coordination nodes, which can only be fail-crash. To illustrate the model we introduce HeterTrust as a practical trustworthy service replication protocol. It has a low latency overhead, requires few execution nodes with diversified design, and prevents intruded servers from disclosing confidential data. We also discuss applications of the model to DoS attacks mitigation and to group membership. © 2007 IEEE.
AB - Fault tolerant distributed protocols typically utilize a homogeneous fault model, either fail-crash or fail-Byzantine, where all processors are assumed to fail in the same manner. In practice, due to complexity and evolvability reasons, only a subset of the nodes can actually be designed to have a restricted, fail-crash failure mode, provided that they are free of design faults. Based on this consideration, we propose a fail-heterogeneous architectural model for distributed systems which considers two classes of nodes: (a) full-fledged execution nodes, which can be fail-Byzantine, and (b) lightweight, validated coordination nodes, which can only be fail-crash. To illustrate the model we introduce HeterTrust as a practical trustworthy service replication protocol. It has a low latency overhead, requires few execution nodes with diversified design, and prevents intruded servers from disclosing confidential data. We also discuss applications of the model to DoS attacks mitigation and to group membership. © 2007 IEEE.
KW - Computer crime
KW - Distributed computer systems
KW - Failure analysis
KW - Quality assurance
KW - Reliability
KW - Technical presentations
KW - Architectural modeling
KW - Confidential data
KW - Crash failures
KW - Design faults
KW - Distributed protocols
KW - Distributed Systems
KW - DOS attacks
KW - Evolvability
KW - Execution nodes
KW - Fault modeling
KW - Fault-tolerant
KW - Group memberships
KW - International symposium
KW - Low latency
KW - Reliable Distributed Systems
KW - Service replication
KW - Fault tolerant computer systems
U2 - 10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688
DO - 10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688
M3 - Conference contribution/Paper
SN - 076952995X
SP - 103
EP - 113
BT - 2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007)
PB - IEEE
ER -