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The fail-heterogeneous architectural model

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The fail-heterogeneous architectural model. / Serafini, M.; Suri, Neeraj.
2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007). IEEE, 2007. p. 103-113.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review

Harvard

Serafini, M & Suri, N 2007, The fail-heterogeneous architectural model. in 2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007). IEEE, pp. 103-113. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688

APA

Serafini, M., & Suri, N. (2007). The fail-heterogeneous architectural model. In 2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007) (pp. 103-113). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688

Vancouver

Serafini M, Suri N. The fail-heterogeneous architectural model. In 2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007). IEEE. 2007. p. 103-113 doi: 10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688

Author

Serafini, M. ; Suri, Neeraj. / The fail-heterogeneous architectural model. 2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007). IEEE, 2007. pp. 103-113

Bibtex

@inproceedings{a87347e3ba124560afbe2e0e678f179c,
title = "The fail-heterogeneous architectural model",
abstract = "Fault tolerant distributed protocols typically utilize a homogeneous fault model, either fail-crash or fail-Byzantine, where all processors are assumed to fail in the same manner. In practice, due to complexity and evolvability reasons, only a subset of the nodes can actually be designed to have a restricted, fail-crash failure mode, provided that they are free of design faults. Based on this consideration, we propose a fail-heterogeneous architectural model for distributed systems which considers two classes of nodes: (a) full-fledged execution nodes, which can be fail-Byzantine, and (b) lightweight, validated coordination nodes, which can only be fail-crash. To illustrate the model we introduce HeterTrust as a practical trustworthy service replication protocol. It has a low latency overhead, requires few execution nodes with diversified design, and prevents intruded servers from disclosing confidential data. We also discuss applications of the model to DoS attacks mitigation and to group membership. {\textcopyright} 2007 IEEE.",
keywords = "Computer crime, Distributed computer systems, Failure analysis, Quality assurance, Reliability, Technical presentations, Architectural modeling, Confidential data, Crash failures, Design faults, Distributed protocols, Distributed Systems, DOS attacks, Evolvability, Execution nodes, Fault modeling, Fault-tolerant, Group memberships, International symposium, Low latency, Reliable Distributed Systems, Service replication, Fault tolerant computer systems",
author = "M. Serafini and Neeraj Suri",
year = "2007",
month = oct,
day = "10",
doi = "10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688",
language = "English",
isbn = "076952995X",
pages = "103--113",
booktitle = "2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007)",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - The fail-heterogeneous architectural model

AU - Serafini, M.

AU - Suri, Neeraj

PY - 2007/10/10

Y1 - 2007/10/10

N2 - Fault tolerant distributed protocols typically utilize a homogeneous fault model, either fail-crash or fail-Byzantine, where all processors are assumed to fail in the same manner. In practice, due to complexity and evolvability reasons, only a subset of the nodes can actually be designed to have a restricted, fail-crash failure mode, provided that they are free of design faults. Based on this consideration, we propose a fail-heterogeneous architectural model for distributed systems which considers two classes of nodes: (a) full-fledged execution nodes, which can be fail-Byzantine, and (b) lightweight, validated coordination nodes, which can only be fail-crash. To illustrate the model we introduce HeterTrust as a practical trustworthy service replication protocol. It has a low latency overhead, requires few execution nodes with diversified design, and prevents intruded servers from disclosing confidential data. We also discuss applications of the model to DoS attacks mitigation and to group membership. © 2007 IEEE.

AB - Fault tolerant distributed protocols typically utilize a homogeneous fault model, either fail-crash or fail-Byzantine, where all processors are assumed to fail in the same manner. In practice, due to complexity and evolvability reasons, only a subset of the nodes can actually be designed to have a restricted, fail-crash failure mode, provided that they are free of design faults. Based on this consideration, we propose a fail-heterogeneous architectural model for distributed systems which considers two classes of nodes: (a) full-fledged execution nodes, which can be fail-Byzantine, and (b) lightweight, validated coordination nodes, which can only be fail-crash. To illustrate the model we introduce HeterTrust as a practical trustworthy service replication protocol. It has a low latency overhead, requires few execution nodes with diversified design, and prevents intruded servers from disclosing confidential data. We also discuss applications of the model to DoS attacks mitigation and to group membership. © 2007 IEEE.

KW - Computer crime

KW - Distributed computer systems

KW - Failure analysis

KW - Quality assurance

KW - Reliability

KW - Technical presentations

KW - Architectural modeling

KW - Confidential data

KW - Crash failures

KW - Design faults

KW - Distributed protocols

KW - Distributed Systems

KW - DOS attacks

KW - Evolvability

KW - Execution nodes

KW - Fault modeling

KW - Fault-tolerant

KW - Group memberships

KW - International symposium

KW - Low latency

KW - Reliable Distributed Systems

KW - Service replication

KW - Fault tolerant computer systems

U2 - 10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688

DO - 10.1109/SRDS.2007.4365688

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 076952995X

SP - 103

EP - 113

BT - 2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007)

PB - IEEE

ER -