TY - JOUR

T1 - The formateurs' role in government formation

AU - Seidmann, D.J.

AU - Winter, E.

AU - Pavlov, E.

PY - 2007/6

Y1 - 2007/6

N2 - Following an election, Heads of State typically choose a formateur to report back a prospective government by some deadline. If this formateur fails then another party leader is chosen on the same terms. We model this mechanism as a bargaining game, in which a single party leader has exclusive access to the Head of State, but does not have a monopoly on making proposals. We characterize the unique equilibrium of the game in which all parties are symmetric and parties split a fixed-size pie. We also show that supra-minimal governments may form when parties are asymmetrically sized: a result consistent with the evidence on government formation in countries which use a formateur mechanism. © Springer-Verlag 2007.

AB - Following an election, Heads of State typically choose a formateur to report back a prospective government by some deadline. If this formateur fails then another party leader is chosen on the same terms. We model this mechanism as a bargaining game, in which a single party leader has exclusive access to the Head of State, but does not have a monopoly on making proposals. We characterize the unique equilibrium of the game in which all parties are symmetric and parties split a fixed-size pie. We also show that supra-minimal governments may form when parties are asymmetrically sized: a result consistent with the evidence on government formation in countries which use a formateur mechanism. © Springer-Verlag 2007.

KW - Formateurs

KW - Government formation

KW - Sequential bargaining

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-006-0102-x

DO - 10.1007/s00199-006-0102-x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 31

SP - 427

EP - 445

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 3

ER -