Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Br...
View graph of relations

The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist Approach

Research output: Contribution to conference - Without ISBN/ISSN Conference paperpeer-review

Published

Standard

The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist Approach. / Turpin, Lee D.
2018. Paper presented at ECPR General Conference 2018, Hamburg, Germany.

Research output: Contribution to conference - Without ISBN/ISSN Conference paperpeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Turpin LD. The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist Approach. 2018. Paper presented at ECPR General Conference 2018, Hamburg, Germany.

Author

Turpin, Lee D. / The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit : A Neoclassical Realist Approach. Paper presented at ECPR General Conference 2018, Hamburg, Germany.7 p.

Bibtex

@conference{5f2b320cd8234012ba15d48ce967e761,
title = "The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist Approach",
abstract = "Although initially a key driver behind the development of the EU{\textquoteright}s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) at Saint Malo in 1998, the UK has since come to be criticized for paralyzing this aspect of the European integration project. This paper draws upon a neoclassical realist analytical framework (Rose 1998; Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman 2009), which in contrast to Waltzian neo-realism allows room for domestic as well as international variables to be taken into account, to examine the UK approach towards the CSDP. This builds upon the work of Cladi and Locatelli (2012; 2013; 2015) in arguing that EU member states have been incentivised by the international system to engage with security and defence cooperation, but finds that the scope and nature of their engagement is impacted by unit-level intervening variables. This paper specifically identifies security culture (Kraus 1999) as one such important domestic factor through which UK involvement in the CSDP may be understood. It argues that this has helped shape the UK{\textquoteright}s role with regards to the CSDP, where it has acted as both an important limiter and facilitator of its development since its inception. Furthermore, the paper finds that the core structural incentives for the UK to engage in European defence cooperation remain and therefore we may expect moves to solidify UK involvement in European defence post-Brexit, with the specific nature of this being conditioned by domestic pressures including security culture. ",
author = "Turpin, {Lee D}",
year = "2018",
month = aug,
day = "25",
language = "English",
note = "ECPR General Conference 2018 ; Conference date: 22-08-2018 Through 25-08-2018",
url = "https://ecpr.eu/Events/EventDetails.aspx?EventID=115",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit

T2 - ECPR General Conference 2018

AU - Turpin, Lee D

PY - 2018/8/25

Y1 - 2018/8/25

N2 - Although initially a key driver behind the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) at Saint Malo in 1998, the UK has since come to be criticized for paralyzing this aspect of the European integration project. This paper draws upon a neoclassical realist analytical framework (Rose 1998; Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman 2009), which in contrast to Waltzian neo-realism allows room for domestic as well as international variables to be taken into account, to examine the UK approach towards the CSDP. This builds upon the work of Cladi and Locatelli (2012; 2013; 2015) in arguing that EU member states have been incentivised by the international system to engage with security and defence cooperation, but finds that the scope and nature of their engagement is impacted by unit-level intervening variables. This paper specifically identifies security culture (Kraus 1999) as one such important domestic factor through which UK involvement in the CSDP may be understood. It argues that this has helped shape the UK’s role with regards to the CSDP, where it has acted as both an important limiter and facilitator of its development since its inception. Furthermore, the paper finds that the core structural incentives for the UK to engage in European defence cooperation remain and therefore we may expect moves to solidify UK involvement in European defence post-Brexit, with the specific nature of this being conditioned by domestic pressures including security culture.

AB - Although initially a key driver behind the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) at Saint Malo in 1998, the UK has since come to be criticized for paralyzing this aspect of the European integration project. This paper draws upon a neoclassical realist analytical framework (Rose 1998; Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman 2009), which in contrast to Waltzian neo-realism allows room for domestic as well as international variables to be taken into account, to examine the UK approach towards the CSDP. This builds upon the work of Cladi and Locatelli (2012; 2013; 2015) in arguing that EU member states have been incentivised by the international system to engage with security and defence cooperation, but finds that the scope and nature of their engagement is impacted by unit-level intervening variables. This paper specifically identifies security culture (Kraus 1999) as one such important domestic factor through which UK involvement in the CSDP may be understood. It argues that this has helped shape the UK’s role with regards to the CSDP, where it has acted as both an important limiter and facilitator of its development since its inception. Furthermore, the paper finds that the core structural incentives for the UK to engage in European defence cooperation remain and therefore we may expect moves to solidify UK involvement in European defence post-Brexit, with the specific nature of this being conditioned by domestic pressures including security culture.

M3 - Conference paper

Y2 - 22 August 2018 through 25 August 2018

ER -