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The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments

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The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments. / Vateva-Gurova, T.; Suri, Neeraj; Mendelson, A. et al.
2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing. IEEE, 2015. p. 1910-1917.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Vateva-Gurova, T, Suri, N, Mendelson, A, Atzori, L (ed.), Jin, X (ed.), Jarvis, S (ed.), Liu, L (ed.), Calvo, RA (ed.), Hu, J (ed.), Min, G (ed.), Georgalas, N (ed.) & Wu, Y (ed.) 2015, The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments. in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing. IEEE, pp. 1910-1917. https://doi.org/10.1109/CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM.2015.283

APA

Vateva-Gurova, T., Suri, N., Mendelson, A., Atzori, L. (Ed.), Jin, X. (Ed.), Jarvis, S. (Ed.), Liu, L. (Ed.), Calvo, R. A. (Ed.), Hu, J. (Ed.), Min, G. (Ed.), Georgalas, N. (Ed.), & Wu, Y. (Ed.) (2015). The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing (pp. 1910-1917). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM.2015.283

Vancouver

Vateva-Gurova T, Suri N, Mendelson A, Atzori L, (ed.), Jin X, (ed.), Jarvis S, (ed.) et al. The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing. IEEE. 2015. p. 1910-1917 doi: 10.1109/CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM.2015.283

Author

Vateva-Gurova, T. ; Suri, Neeraj ; Mendelson, A. et al. / The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing. IEEE, 2015. pp. 1910-1917

Bibtex

@inproceedings{abaa781dee2a4de7853a2156ef921a79,
title = "The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments",
abstract = "A virtualized environment (VE) is expected to provide secure logical isolation across the co-located tenants encapsulated in the virtual machines. In particular the VE should prevent covert-channels exploitation stemming from the usage of shared resources. However, as sophisticated covert- and side-channel attacks exist, the logical isolation in a VE is often considered insufficient to raise concerns about the security in VEs e.g., the Cloud. Technically, the actual feasibility of such attacks strongly depends on the specific context of the execution environment and the resource allocation schemas used in the virtualization solution. Addressing these VE aspects, we detail the effect of scheduling parameters on the noise (affecting the information leakage) in the covert-channel and empirically validate the impact on the feasibility of covert-channel attacks, using a real VE. {\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE.",
keywords = "Scheduling, Side channel attack, Virtual reality, Covert channels, Execution environments, Information leakage, Scheduling parameters, Shared resources, Virtual machines, Virtualizations, Virtualized environment, Ubiquitous computing",
author = "T. Vateva-Gurova and Neeraj Suri and A. Mendelson and L. Atzori and X. Jin and S. Jarvis and L. Liu and R.A. Calvo and J. Hu and G. Min and N. Georgalas and Y. Wu",
year = "2015",
month = oct,
day = "26",
doi = "10.1109/CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM.2015.283",
language = "English",
pages = "1910--1917",
booktitle = "2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - The impact of hypervisor scheduling on compromising virtualized environments

AU - Vateva-Gurova, T.

AU - Suri, Neeraj

AU - Mendelson, A.

A2 - Atzori, L.

A2 - Jin, X.

A2 - Jarvis, S.

A2 - Liu, L.

A2 - Calvo, R.A.

A2 - Hu, J.

A2 - Min, G.

A2 - Georgalas, N.

A2 - Wu, Y.

PY - 2015/10/26

Y1 - 2015/10/26

N2 - A virtualized environment (VE) is expected to provide secure logical isolation across the co-located tenants encapsulated in the virtual machines. In particular the VE should prevent covert-channels exploitation stemming from the usage of shared resources. However, as sophisticated covert- and side-channel attacks exist, the logical isolation in a VE is often considered insufficient to raise concerns about the security in VEs e.g., the Cloud. Technically, the actual feasibility of such attacks strongly depends on the specific context of the execution environment and the resource allocation schemas used in the virtualization solution. Addressing these VE aspects, we detail the effect of scheduling parameters on the noise (affecting the information leakage) in the covert-channel and empirically validate the impact on the feasibility of covert-channel attacks, using a real VE. © 2015 IEEE.

AB - A virtualized environment (VE) is expected to provide secure logical isolation across the co-located tenants encapsulated in the virtual machines. In particular the VE should prevent covert-channels exploitation stemming from the usage of shared resources. However, as sophisticated covert- and side-channel attacks exist, the logical isolation in a VE is often considered insufficient to raise concerns about the security in VEs e.g., the Cloud. Technically, the actual feasibility of such attacks strongly depends on the specific context of the execution environment and the resource allocation schemas used in the virtualization solution. Addressing these VE aspects, we detail the effect of scheduling parameters on the noise (affecting the information leakage) in the covert-channel and empirically validate the impact on the feasibility of covert-channel attacks, using a real VE. © 2015 IEEE.

KW - Scheduling

KW - Side channel attack

KW - Virtual reality

KW - Covert channels

KW - Execution environments

KW - Information leakage

KW - Scheduling parameters

KW - Shared resources

KW - Virtual machines

KW - Virtualizations

KW - Virtualized environment

KW - Ubiquitous computing

U2 - 10.1109/CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM.2015.283

DO - 10.1109/CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM.2015.283

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SP - 1910

EP - 1917

BT - 2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing

PB - IEEE

ER -