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The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms. / Dinh, Trung Quang; Calabrò, Andrea; Campopiano, Giovanna et al.
In: Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 07.01.2021.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Dinh, TQ, Calabrò, A, Campopiano, G & Basco, R 2021, 'The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms', Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1177/1042258720985477

APA

Dinh, T. Q., Calabrò, A., Campopiano, G., & Basco, R. (2021). The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/1042258720985477

Vancouver

Dinh TQ, Calabrò A, Campopiano G, Basco R. The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. 2021 Jan 7. Epub 2021 Jan 7. doi: 10.1177/1042258720985477

Author

Dinh, Trung Quang ; Calabrò, Andrea ; Campopiano, Giovanna et al. / The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance : A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms. In: Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. 2021.

Bibtex

@article{6697fa09a69d484eb2ab9258c47f3b5a,
title = "The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms",
abstract = "Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.",
keywords = "board of directors, family CEO, family firm, firm performance, former SOEs, political connection, transition economy, Vietnam",
author = "Dinh, {Trung Quang} and Andrea Calabr{\`o} and Giovanna Campopiano and Rodrigo Basco",
year = "2021",
month = jan,
day = "7",
doi = "10.1177/1042258720985477",
language = "English",
journal = "Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice",
issn = "1042-2587",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance

T2 - A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms

AU - Dinh, Trung Quang

AU - Calabrò, Andrea

AU - Campopiano, Giovanna

AU - Basco, Rodrigo

PY - 2021/1/7

Y1 - 2021/1/7

N2 - Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.

AB - Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.

KW - board of directors

KW - family CEO

KW - family firm

KW - firm performance

KW - former SOEs

KW - political connection

KW - transition economy

KW - Vietnam

U2 - 10.1177/1042258720985477

DO - 10.1177/1042258720985477

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85098943737

JO - Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

JF - Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

SN - 1042-2587

ER -