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The matching problem for evolutionary psychiatry

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The matching problem for evolutionary psychiatry. / Maung, H.H.
In: Philosophical Psychology, 15.05.2024.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Maung HH. The matching problem for evolutionary psychiatry. Philosophical Psychology. 2024 May 15. Epub 2024 May 15. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2024.2354437

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Maung, H.H. / The matching problem for evolutionary psychiatry. In: Philosophical Psychology. 2024.

Bibtex

@article{07fba9e5206743889e0011f8a9aabb23,
title = "The matching problem for evolutionary psychiatry",
abstract = "Evolutionary psychiatry suggests that mental disorders can be explained in evolutionary terms (a) as failures of psychological mechanisms to produce the adaptive effects for which they were naturally selected, (b) as mismatches between naturally selected psychological mechanisms and contemporary environmental pressures, or (c) as naturally selected psychological mechanisms whose effects continue to be adaptive. In this paper, I present a philosophical critique of evolutionary psychiatry that draws on Subrena Smith{\textquoteright}s matching problem for evolutionary psychology. For evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses to be empirically supported, proponents of evolutionary psychiatry must demonstrate (1) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms involved in mental disorders resemble the psychological mechanisms of our evolutionary ancestors, (2) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms are phylogenetically descended from the ancestral psychological mechanisms, and (3) that the ancestral psychological mechanisms were naturally selected because their effects had adaptive benefits. However, for many mental disorders, evolutionary psychiatry lacks the methodological resources to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, many evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses are empirically untestable and remain indefinitely underdetermined by data.",
author = "H.H. Maung",
year = "2024",
month = may,
day = "15",
doi = "10.1080/09515089.2024.2354437",
language = "English",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
issn = "0951-5089",
publisher = "Routledge",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The matching problem for evolutionary psychiatry

AU - Maung, H.H.

PY - 2024/5/15

Y1 - 2024/5/15

N2 - Evolutionary psychiatry suggests that mental disorders can be explained in evolutionary terms (a) as failures of psychological mechanisms to produce the adaptive effects for which they were naturally selected, (b) as mismatches between naturally selected psychological mechanisms and contemporary environmental pressures, or (c) as naturally selected psychological mechanisms whose effects continue to be adaptive. In this paper, I present a philosophical critique of evolutionary psychiatry that draws on Subrena Smith’s matching problem for evolutionary psychology. For evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses to be empirically supported, proponents of evolutionary psychiatry must demonstrate (1) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms involved in mental disorders resemble the psychological mechanisms of our evolutionary ancestors, (2) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms are phylogenetically descended from the ancestral psychological mechanisms, and (3) that the ancestral psychological mechanisms were naturally selected because their effects had adaptive benefits. However, for many mental disorders, evolutionary psychiatry lacks the methodological resources to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, many evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses are empirically untestable and remain indefinitely underdetermined by data.

AB - Evolutionary psychiatry suggests that mental disorders can be explained in evolutionary terms (a) as failures of psychological mechanisms to produce the adaptive effects for which they were naturally selected, (b) as mismatches between naturally selected psychological mechanisms and contemporary environmental pressures, or (c) as naturally selected psychological mechanisms whose effects continue to be adaptive. In this paper, I present a philosophical critique of evolutionary psychiatry that draws on Subrena Smith’s matching problem for evolutionary psychology. For evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses to be empirically supported, proponents of evolutionary psychiatry must demonstrate (1) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms involved in mental disorders resemble the psychological mechanisms of our evolutionary ancestors, (2) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms are phylogenetically descended from the ancestral psychological mechanisms, and (3) that the ancestral psychological mechanisms were naturally selected because their effects had adaptive benefits. However, for many mental disorders, evolutionary psychiatry lacks the methodological resources to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, many evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses are empirically untestable and remain indefinitely underdetermined by data.

U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2024.2354437

DO - 10.1080/09515089.2024.2354437

M3 - Journal article

JO - Philosophical Psychology

JF - Philosophical Psychology

SN - 0951-5089

ER -