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The morality of harm

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The morality of harm. / Sousa, Paulo; Holbrook, Colin; Piazza, Jared.
In: Cognition, Vol. 113, No. 1, 10.2009, p. 80-92.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Sousa, P, Holbrook, C & Piazza, J 2009, 'The morality of harm', Cognition, vol. 113, no. 1, pp. 80-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.015

APA

Sousa, P., Holbrook, C., & Piazza, J. (2009). The morality of harm. Cognition, 113(1), 80-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.015

Vancouver

Sousa P, Holbrook C, Piazza J. The morality of harm. Cognition. 2009 Oct;113(1):80-92. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.015

Author

Sousa, Paulo ; Holbrook, Colin ; Piazza, Jared. / The morality of harm. In: Cognition. 2009 ; Vol. 113, No. 1. pp. 80-92.

Bibtex

@article{ad0797d6513c4a73935d1a6bc5ff1d09,
title = "The morality of harm",
abstract = "In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler{\textquoteright}s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117–131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants{\textquoteright} judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants{\textquoteright} judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel{\textquoteright}s traditional hypothesis.",
keywords = "Morality, Harm , Transgression , Deontic reasoning , Social cognition",
author = "Paulo Sousa and Colin Holbrook and Jared Piazza",
year = "2009",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.015",
language = "English",
volume = "113",
pages = "80--92",
journal = "Cognition",
issn = "0010-0277",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The morality of harm

AU - Sousa, Paulo

AU - Holbrook, Colin

AU - Piazza, Jared

PY - 2009/10

Y1 - 2009/10

N2 - In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler’s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117–131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants’ judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants’ judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel’s traditional hypothesis.

AB - In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler’s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117–131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants’ judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants’ judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel’s traditional hypothesis.

KW - Morality

KW - Harm

KW - Transgression

KW - Deontic reasoning

KW - Social cognition

U2 - 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.015

DO - 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.015

M3 - Journal article

VL - 113

SP - 80

EP - 92

JO - Cognition

JF - Cognition

SN - 0010-0277

IS - 1

ER -