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The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games

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The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. / Deb, R.; Weber, S.; Winter, E.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2, 06.1996, p. 189-198.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Deb, R, Weber, S & Winter, E 1996, 'The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 189-198. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247101

APA

Deb, R., Weber, S., & Winter, E. (1996). The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. International Journal of Game Theory, 25(2), 189-198. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247101

Vancouver

Deb R, Weber S, Winter E. The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. International Journal of Game Theory. 1996 Jun;25(2):189-198. doi: 10.1007/BF01247101

Author

Deb, R. ; Weber, S. ; Winter, E. / The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 1996 ; Vol. 25, No. 2. pp. 189-198.

Bibtex

@article{08a2d8c98fa942709e13d75b52573055,
title = "The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games",
abstract = "Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.",
keywords = "Economic Theory, Game Theory, Finite Number, Preference Relation , Natural Extension ",
author = "R. Deb and S. Weber and E. Winter",
year = "1996",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1007/BF01247101",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "189--198",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games

AU - Deb, R.

AU - Weber, S.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1996/6

Y1 - 1996/6

N2 - Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.

AB - Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.

KW - Economic Theory

KW - Game Theory

KW - Finite Number

KW - Preference Relation

KW - Natural Extension

U2 - 10.1007/BF01247101

DO - 10.1007/BF01247101

M3 - Journal article

VL - 25

SP - 189

EP - 198

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 2

ER -