Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > The partnered core of a game with side payments

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

The partnered core of a game with side payments

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

The partnered core of a game with side payments. / Reny, P.J.; Winter, E.; Wooders, M.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, 2012, p. 521-536.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Reny, PJ, Winter, E & Wooders, M 2012, 'The partnered core of a game with side payments', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39, no. 2-3, pp. 521-536. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9

APA

Reny, P. J., Winter, E., & Wooders, M. (2012). The partnered core of a game with side payments. Social Choice and Welfare, 39(2-3), 521-536. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9

Vancouver

Reny PJ, Winter E, Wooders M. The partnered core of a game with side payments. Social Choice and Welfare. 2012;39(2-3):521-536. doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9

Author

Reny, P.J. ; Winter, E. ; Wooders, M. / The partnered core of a game with side payments. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 2012 ; Vol. 39, No. 2-3. pp. 521-536.

Bibtex

@article{b38c276219ea452f9335ede585cead8f,
title = "The partnered core of a game with side payments",
abstract = "An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games. {\textcopyright} 2012 Springer-Verlag.",
keywords = "Game Theory, Cooperative Game, Coalition Formation , Coalition Structure, Relative Interior ",
author = "P.J. Reny and E. Winter and M. Wooders",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9",
language = "English",
volume = "39",
pages = "521--536",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "0176-1714",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2-3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The partnered core of a game with side payments

AU - Reny, P.J.

AU - Winter, E.

AU - Wooders, M.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

AB - An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

KW - Game Theory

KW - Cooperative Game

KW - Coalition Formation

KW - Coalition Structure

KW - Relative Interior

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9

DO - 10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9

M3 - Journal article

VL - 39

SP - 521

EP - 536

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

IS - 2-3

ER -