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The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points. / Isoni, Andrea; Sugden, Robert; Zheng, Jiwei.
In: European Economic Review, Vol. 127, 103428, 01.08.2020.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Isoni, A, Sugden, R & Zheng, J 2020, 'The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points', European Economic Review, vol. 127, 103428. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

APA

Isoni, A., Sugden, R., & Zheng, J. (2020). The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points. European Economic Review, 127, Article 103428. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

Vancouver

Isoni A, Sugden R, Zheng J. The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points. European Economic Review. 2020 Aug 1;127:103428. Epub 2020 May 18. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

Author

Isoni, Andrea ; Sugden, Robert ; Zheng, Jiwei. / The pizza night game : Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points. In: European Economic Review. 2020 ; Vol. 127.

Bibtex

@article{45a159ed9d6e4c84aa19d858e75950cf,
title = "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points",
abstract = "We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.",
keywords = "Pizza night game, Tacit bargaining, Conflict of interest, Payoff inequality, Focal points",
author = "Andrea Isoni and Robert Sugden and Jiwei Zheng",
year = "2020",
month = aug,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428",
language = "English",
volume = "127",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The pizza night game

T2 - Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points

AU - Isoni, Andrea

AU - Sugden, Robert

AU - Zheng, Jiwei

PY - 2020/8/1

Y1 - 2020/8/1

N2 - We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.

AB - We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.

KW - Pizza night game

KW - Tacit bargaining

KW - Conflict of interest

KW - Payoff inequality

KW - Focal points

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

M3 - Journal article

VL - 127

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

M1 - 103428

ER -