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The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures

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The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures. / Read, R A.
Lancaster University: The Department of Economics, 2005. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Read, RA 2005 'The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures' Economics Working Paper Series, The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

APA

Vancouver

Read RA. The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures. Lancaster University: The Department of Economics. 2005. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Read, R A. / The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures. Lancaster University : The Department of Economics, 2005. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{8b73fce0752e4b2887a9886638444085,
title = "The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures",
abstract = "This paper analyses the political economy of trade protection in the context of the factors determining the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel imposed March 2002. The paper identifies several factors in addition to the official justification stated problems of global over-capacity and the penetration of imports in the US market, namely the continued failure to restructure poorly performing firms, failure of previous attempts at protection and the influence of the domestic steel lobby and short-term political gains to the Bush Administration of protectionist action. The paper also reviews several ex ante and ex post empirical studies of the impact of the steel Safeguards on the steel industry and downstream steel-consuming activities. All of these studies find that the costs of the Safeguard Measures outweighed their benefits in terms of aggregate GDP and employment as well as having an important redistributive impact. The paper provides a brief summary of the subsequent WTO steel case and the final resolution of the dispute. The evidence suggests that the steel Safeguards owed more to political expediency than justification for protection under the WTO rules.",
keywords = "WTO, steel dispute, Emergency Safeguard Measures, costs and benefits of protection",
author = "Read, {R A}",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures

AU - Read, R A

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - This paper analyses the political economy of trade protection in the context of the factors determining the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel imposed March 2002. The paper identifies several factors in addition to the official justification stated problems of global over-capacity and the penetration of imports in the US market, namely the continued failure to restructure poorly performing firms, failure of previous attempts at protection and the influence of the domestic steel lobby and short-term political gains to the Bush Administration of protectionist action. The paper also reviews several ex ante and ex post empirical studies of the impact of the steel Safeguards on the steel industry and downstream steel-consuming activities. All of these studies find that the costs of the Safeguard Measures outweighed their benefits in terms of aggregate GDP and employment as well as having an important redistributive impact. The paper provides a brief summary of the subsequent WTO steel case and the final resolution of the dispute. The evidence suggests that the steel Safeguards owed more to political expediency than justification for protection under the WTO rules.

AB - This paper analyses the political economy of trade protection in the context of the factors determining the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel imposed March 2002. The paper identifies several factors in addition to the official justification stated problems of global over-capacity and the penetration of imports in the US market, namely the continued failure to restructure poorly performing firms, failure of previous attempts at protection and the influence of the domestic steel lobby and short-term political gains to the Bush Administration of protectionist action. The paper also reviews several ex ante and ex post empirical studies of the impact of the steel Safeguards on the steel industry and downstream steel-consuming activities. All of these studies find that the costs of the Safeguard Measures outweighed their benefits in terms of aggregate GDP and employment as well as having an important redistributive impact. The paper provides a brief summary of the subsequent WTO steel case and the final resolution of the dispute. The evidence suggests that the steel Safeguards owed more to political expediency than justification for protection under the WTO rules.

KW - WTO

KW - steel dispute

KW - Emergency Safeguard Measures

KW - costs and benefits of protection

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - The political economy of trade protection: the determinants and welfare impact of the 2002 US emergency steel safeguard measures

PB - The Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster University

ER -