TY - CHAP

T1 - The Right to Press Freedom of Expression vs the Rights of Marginalised Groups: An Answer Grounded in Personhood Rights

AU - Smith, Leonie

PY - 2020/6/6

Y1 - 2020/6/6

N2 - No case in which a member of the UK print press media (‘PPM’) uses pejorative language against a group of people as a class in print can ever fall foul of the Editors’ Code (the industry’s main code of conduct) anti-discrimination guidelines. This results in the main regulatory body for the national press, IPSO, concluding that news articles with content describing, e.g., asylum seekers, as “spreading like a norovirus” and “a plague of feral humans”, are not even investigable on the grounds of discrimination (IPSO, 02741-15 Greer v The Sun).Opponents and proponents of the above approach typically frame this as a classic ‘free speech’ vs ‘harm principle’ dilemma. Specifically, that we need to balance:(A) The need for a free press within a functioning democracy; and (B) The harms caused to marginalised groups by derogatory and prejudicial language about them.Those in favour of press freedom argue that the PPM’s right to freedom of expression beats any perceived or actual harm caused, and those against argue the opposite. Predictably, little progress is made in either party convincing the other.Here, I argue that we ought to instead ask, what grounds the PPM’s freedom of the press? I propose that one plausible answer is: the value of agential epistemic participation. And that we cannot uphold that value at the same time as permitting discriminatory reporting against collectives of individuals. This offers a strong basis from which to argue for a change in PPM policy, to allow discrimination claims against groups of individuals to be heard. Further, when we consider the role of epistemic participation in one’s ability to perform as a person, we ought to find that most complaints will find in the favour of the group in question, rather than the PPM.

AB - No case in which a member of the UK print press media (‘PPM’) uses pejorative language against a group of people as a class in print can ever fall foul of the Editors’ Code (the industry’s main code of conduct) anti-discrimination guidelines. This results in the main regulatory body for the national press, IPSO, concluding that news articles with content describing, e.g., asylum seekers, as “spreading like a norovirus” and “a plague of feral humans”, are not even investigable on the grounds of discrimination (IPSO, 02741-15 Greer v The Sun).Opponents and proponents of the above approach typically frame this as a classic ‘free speech’ vs ‘harm principle’ dilemma. Specifically, that we need to balance:(A) The need for a free press within a functioning democracy; and (B) The harms caused to marginalised groups by derogatory and prejudicial language about them.Those in favour of press freedom argue that the PPM’s right to freedom of expression beats any perceived or actual harm caused, and those against argue the opposite. Predictably, little progress is made in either party convincing the other.Here, I argue that we ought to instead ask, what grounds the PPM’s freedom of the press? I propose that one plausible answer is: the value of agential epistemic participation. And that we cannot uphold that value at the same time as permitting discriminatory reporting against collectives of individuals. This offers a strong basis from which to argue for a change in PPM policy, to allow discrimination claims against groups of individuals to be heard. Further, when we consider the role of epistemic participation in one’s ability to perform as a person, we ought to find that most complaints will find in the favour of the group in question, rather than the PPM.

UR - https://philpapers.org/rec/SMITRT-5

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9783110663082

SP - 79

BT - Social Ontology, Normativity and Law

PB - De Gruyter

ER -