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The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances

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The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances. / Rietzke, David; Roberson, Brian.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, No. 4, 04.2013, p. 937-956.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Rietzke, D & Roberson, B 2013, 'The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 937-956. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

APA

Rietzke, D., & Roberson, B. (2013). The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(4), 937-956. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

Vancouver

Rietzke D, Roberson B. The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances. Social Choice and Welfare. 2013 Apr;40(4):937-956. doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

Author

Rietzke, David ; Roberson, Brian. / The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 2013 ; Vol. 40, No. 4. pp. 937-956.

Bibtex

@article{b570d4836a9e493989df5cf57370cba1,
title = "The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances",
abstract = "We examine a three-player, three-stage game of alliance formation followed by multi-battle conflict. There are two disjoint sets of battlefields, each of which is associated with a player who competes only within that set. The common enemy competes in both sets of battlefields. An {\textquoteleft}enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend{\textquoteright} alliance forms when the two players facing the common enemy agree on a pre-conflict transfer of resources among themselves. We examine the case in which the players may commit to binding ex post transfers (alliances with full commitment) and the case in which ex post transfers are not feasible (self-enforcing alliances). Models that utilize the lottery contest success function typically yield qualitatively different results from those arising in models with the auction contest success function. However, under both contest success functions, alliances with full commitment result in identical alliance transfers for all parameter configurations, and self-enforcing alliances yield identical transfers over a subset of the parameter space. Our results, thus, provide a partial robustness result for {\textquoteleft}enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend{\textquoteright} alliances.",
author = "David Rietzke and Brian Roberson",
year = "2013",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x",
language = "English",
volume = "40",
pages = "937--956",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "1432-217X",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances

AU - Rietzke, David

AU - Roberson, Brian

PY - 2013/4

Y1 - 2013/4

N2 - We examine a three-player, three-stage game of alliance formation followed by multi-battle conflict. There are two disjoint sets of battlefields, each of which is associated with a player who competes only within that set. The common enemy competes in both sets of battlefields. An ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliance forms when the two players facing the common enemy agree on a pre-conflict transfer of resources among themselves. We examine the case in which the players may commit to binding ex post transfers (alliances with full commitment) and the case in which ex post transfers are not feasible (self-enforcing alliances). Models that utilize the lottery contest success function typically yield qualitatively different results from those arising in models with the auction contest success function. However, under both contest success functions, alliances with full commitment result in identical alliance transfers for all parameter configurations, and self-enforcing alliances yield identical transfers over a subset of the parameter space. Our results, thus, provide a partial robustness result for ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances.

AB - We examine a three-player, three-stage game of alliance formation followed by multi-battle conflict. There are two disjoint sets of battlefields, each of which is associated with a player who competes only within that set. The common enemy competes in both sets of battlefields. An ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliance forms when the two players facing the common enemy agree on a pre-conflict transfer of resources among themselves. We examine the case in which the players may commit to binding ex post transfers (alliances with full commitment) and the case in which ex post transfers are not feasible (self-enforcing alliances). Models that utilize the lottery contest success function typically yield qualitatively different results from those arising in models with the auction contest success function. However, under both contest success functions, alliances with full commitment result in identical alliance transfers for all parameter configurations, and self-enforcing alliances yield identical transfers over a subset of the parameter space. Our results, thus, provide a partial robustness result for ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances.

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

DO - 10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 40

SP - 937

EP - 956

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 1432-217X

IS - 4

ER -