Rights statement: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/health-economics-policy-and-law/article/role-of-eu-competition-law-in-health-care-and-the-undertaking-concept/434C6A7597A80F1B37136CE93B5B616E The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Health Economics, Policy and Law, 16 (Special Issue 1), pp 76-89 2020, © 2020 Cambridge University Press.
Accepted author manuscript, 641 KB, PDF document
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
<mark>Journal publication date</mark> | 1/01/2021 |
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<mark>Journal</mark> | Health Economics, Policy and Law |
Issue number | Special issue 1 |
Volume | 16 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Pages (from-to) | 76-89 |
Publication Status | Published |
Early online date | 30/04/20 |
<mark>Original language</mark> | English |
Part of the controversy surrounding competition and health care stems from the complexity connected with delineating the applicability of competition law - encompassing both the provisions governing anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance and the state-aid rules. Cases determined at the European Union (EU) level within the past 30 years have developed a broad framework, and notable trends have emerged - for example, a distinction between health care providers and managing bodies (purchasers). The former have been subject to an 'abstract' test and the latter to a more sophisticated 'concrete' test. In this paper, we chart the development of the EU courts' approach to developing the 'undertaking' concept in health care and examine the current EU competition law framework with a view to identifying future directions. van de Gronden has recently identified a 'three-prong' test of exemption from competition law in connection with the recent CEPPB case: firstly, where the supply of services is predominantly dependent upon public financing; secondly, the public funding aims to achieve a public interest goal and thirdly, the activities concerned are closely related to this public interest goal. We examine this test in a health care context, drawing on our findings regarding Dutch competition reforms.