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The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement

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The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement. / Estache, A.; Foucart, R.
In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 157, 31.01.2018, p. 95-106.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Estache, A & Foucart, R 2018, 'The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 157, pp. 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.008

APA

Estache, A., & Foucart, R. (2018). The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement. Journal of Public Economics, 157, 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.008

Vancouver

Estache A, Foucart R. The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement. Journal of Public Economics. 2018 Jan 31;157:95-106. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.008

Author

Estache, A. ; Foucart, R. / The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2018 ; Vol. 157. pp. 95-106.

Bibtex

@article{41696a26858446a98df6e79ad488ff5e,
title = "The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement",
abstract = "Cost inefficiencies in public procurement tend to come from two sources: corruption (moral hazard) and incompetence (adverse selection). In most countries, audit authorities are responsible for monitoring costs but do not distinguish both sources of inefficiency in their audits. Judicial courts typically rely on these cost audits, but only sanction corruption. In a model of public procurement by politicians, we study how the respective quality of the two courts affects corruption as well as cost efficiency. We find that while better courts have the direct effect of decreasing corruption, they may have a negative indirect effect on the abilities of the pool of politicians, so that the net effect on cost efficiency is ambiguous. {\textcopyright} 2017 Elsevier B.V.",
keywords = "Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Procurement",
author = "A. Estache and R. Foucart",
note = "Export Date: 2 September 2019 CODEN: JPBEB Correspondence Address: Foucart, R.; Humboldt UniversityGermany; email: renaud.foucart@gmail.com",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.008",
language = "English",
volume = "157",
pages = "95--106",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement

AU - Estache, A.

AU - Foucart, R.

N1 - Export Date: 2 September 2019 CODEN: JPBEB Correspondence Address: Foucart, R.; Humboldt UniversityGermany; email: renaud.foucart@gmail.com

PY - 2018/1/31

Y1 - 2018/1/31

N2 - Cost inefficiencies in public procurement tend to come from two sources: corruption (moral hazard) and incompetence (adverse selection). In most countries, audit authorities are responsible for monitoring costs but do not distinguish both sources of inefficiency in their audits. Judicial courts typically rely on these cost audits, but only sanction corruption. In a model of public procurement by politicians, we study how the respective quality of the two courts affects corruption as well as cost efficiency. We find that while better courts have the direct effect of decreasing corruption, they may have a negative indirect effect on the abilities of the pool of politicians, so that the net effect on cost efficiency is ambiguous. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.

AB - Cost inefficiencies in public procurement tend to come from two sources: corruption (moral hazard) and incompetence (adverse selection). In most countries, audit authorities are responsible for monitoring costs but do not distinguish both sources of inefficiency in their audits. Judicial courts typically rely on these cost audits, but only sanction corruption. In a model of public procurement by politicians, we study how the respective quality of the two courts affects corruption as well as cost efficiency. We find that while better courts have the direct effect of decreasing corruption, they may have a negative indirect effect on the abilities of the pool of politicians, so that the net effect on cost efficiency is ambiguous. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Adverse selection

KW - Moral hazard

KW - Procurement

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 157

SP - 95

EP - 106

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

ER -