Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brandt, R. (2017), The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision. J Appl Philos, 34: 665–678. doi:10.1111/japp.12251 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12251/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision
AU - Brandt, Reuven
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brandt, R. (2017), The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision. J Appl Philos, 34: 665–678. doi:10.1111/japp.12251 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12251/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2017/11
Y1 - 2017/11
N2 - In this article I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children’s intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that arguments in defence of the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring,I note that the precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision remain somewhat unclear.
AB - In this article I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children’s intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that arguments in defence of the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring,I note that the precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision remain somewhat unclear.
U2 - 10.1111/japp.12251
DO - 10.1111/japp.12251
M3 - Journal article
VL - 34
SP - 665
EP - 678
JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy
JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy
SN - 0264-3758
IS - 5
ER -