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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brandt, R. (2017), The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision. J Appl Philos, 34: 665–678. doi:10.1111/japp.12251 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12251/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision

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The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision. / Brandt, Reuven.
In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 5, 11.2017, p. 665-678.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Brandt R. The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 2017 Nov;34(5):665-678. Epub 2016 Nov 3. doi: 10.1111/japp.12251

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Brandt, Reuven. / The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision. In: Journal of Applied Philosophy. 2017 ; Vol. 34, No. 5. pp. 665-678.

Bibtex

@article{ae87ee38b898494c9b1dbabd7fc0d7e8,
title = "The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision",
abstract = "In this article I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children{\textquoteright}s intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that arguments in defence of the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring,I note that the precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision remain somewhat unclear.",
author = "Reuven Brandt",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brandt, R. (2017), The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision. J Appl Philos, 34: 665–678. doi:10.1111/japp.12251 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12251/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2017",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1111/japp.12251",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
pages = "665--678",
journal = "Journal of Applied Philosophy",
issn = "0264-3758",
publisher = "Carfax Publishing Ltd.",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The transfer and delegation of responsibilities for genetic offspring in gamete provision

AU - Brandt, Reuven

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brandt, R. (2017), The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision. J Appl Philos, 34: 665–678. doi:10.1111/japp.12251 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12251/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2017/11

Y1 - 2017/11

N2 - In this article I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children’s intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that arguments in defence of the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring,I note that the precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision remain somewhat unclear.

AB - In this article I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children’s intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that arguments in defence of the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring,I note that the precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision remain somewhat unclear.

U2 - 10.1111/japp.12251

DO - 10.1111/japp.12251

M3 - Journal article

VL - 34

SP - 665

EP - 678

JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy

JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy

SN - 0264-3758

IS - 5

ER -