Final published version, 439 KB, PDF document
Research output: Working paper
Research output: Working paper
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample
AU - Dai, ZHIXIN
AU - Zheng, Jiwei
AU - Zizzo, Daniel J.
PY - 2020/9/1
Y1 - 2020/9/1
N2 - We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators that is matched for likely socio-economic characteristics with our student sample. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students. However, relatively to non-students, students are comparatively more attracted by the focal point under team reasoning when this has equal payoffs and the other outcomes do not.
AB - We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators that is matched for likely socio-economic characteristics with our student sample. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students. However, relatively to non-students, students are comparatively more attracted by the focal point under team reasoning when this has equal payoffs and the other outcomes do not.
KW - external validity
KW - non-student sample
KW - focal points
KW - team reasoning
KW - level-k
KW - coordination games
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Economics Working Papers Series
BT - Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample
PB - The Department of Economics
CY - Lancaster
ER -