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Transferable quotas, efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay, Shetland

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Transferable quotas, efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay, Shetland. / Cardwell, Emma Jayne; Gear, Robert.
In: Marine Policy, Vol. 40, 07.2013, p. 160-166.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Cardwell EJ, Gear R. Transferable quotas, efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay, Shetland. Marine Policy. 2013 Jul;40:160-166. Epub 2013 Feb 21. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2013.01.013

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Cardwell, Emma Jayne ; Gear, Robert. / Transferable quotas, efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay, Shetland. In: Marine Policy. 2013 ; Vol. 40. pp. 160-166.

Bibtex

@article{824e87ddec474d1b9647fc227b58367e,
title = "Transferable quotas, efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay, Shetland",
abstract = "The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management.",
keywords = "Fisheries management, Rights-based management, Individual transferable quotas, Efficiency, Shetland",
author = "Cardwell, {Emma Jayne} and Robert Gear",
year = "2013",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.marpol.2013.01.013",
language = "English",
volume = "40",
pages = "160--166",
journal = "Marine Policy",
issn = "0308-597X",
publisher = "Elsevier Limited",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Transferable quotas, efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay, Shetland

AU - Cardwell, Emma Jayne

AU - Gear, Robert

PY - 2013/7

Y1 - 2013/7

N2 - The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management.

AB - The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management.

KW - Fisheries management

KW - Rights-based management

KW - Individual transferable quotas

KW - Efficiency

KW - Shetland

U2 - 10.1016/j.marpol.2013.01.013

DO - 10.1016/j.marpol.2013.01.013

M3 - Journal article

VL - 40

SP - 160

EP - 166

JO - Marine Policy

JF - Marine Policy

SN - 0308-597X

ER -