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Transparency and incentives among peers

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Transparency and incentives among peers. / Winter, E.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2010, p. 504-523.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 2010, 'Transparency and incentives among peers', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 504-523. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x

APA

Winter, E. (2010). Transparency and incentives among peers. RAND Journal of Economics, 41(3), 504-523. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x

Vancouver

Winter E. Transparency and incentives among peers. RAND Journal of Economics. 2010;41(3):504-523. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x

Author

Winter, E. / Transparency and incentives among peers. In: RAND Journal of Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 41, No. 3. pp. 504-523.

Bibtex

@article{63af752ac67742c0993f0d4d8684c23b,
title = "Transparency and incentives among peers",
abstract = "This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives. {\textcopyright} 2010, RAND.",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "504--523",
journal = "RAND Journal of Economics",
issn = "0741-6261",
publisher = "RAND",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Transparency and incentives among peers

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives. © 2010, RAND.

AB - This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives. © 2010, RAND.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 41

SP - 504

EP - 523

JO - RAND Journal of Economics

JF - RAND Journal of Economics

SN - 0741-6261

IS - 3

ER -