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Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems

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Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems. / Matakos, Konstantinos; Troumpounis, Orestis; Xefteris, Dimitrios.
The political economy of governance: institutions, political performance and elections. ed. / Norman Schofield; Gonzalo Caballero. Springer, 2015. p. 335-362 (Studies in Political Economy).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Harvard

Matakos, K, Troumpounis, O & Xefteris, D 2015, Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems. in N Schofield & G Caballero (eds), The political economy of governance: institutions, political performance and elections. Studies in Political Economy, Springer, pp. 335-362. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_18

APA

Matakos, K., Troumpounis, O., & Xefteris, D. (2015). Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems. In N. Schofield, & G. Caballero (Eds.), The political economy of governance: institutions, political performance and elections (pp. 335-362). (Studies in Political Economy). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_18

Vancouver

Matakos K, Troumpounis O, Xefteris D. Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems. In Schofield N, Caballero G, editors, The political economy of governance: institutions, political performance and elections. Springer. 2015. p. 335-362. (Studies in Political Economy). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_18

Author

Matakos, Konstantinos ; Troumpounis, Orestis ; Xefteris, Dimitrios. / Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems. The political economy of governance: institutions, political performance and elections. editor / Norman Schofield ; Gonzalo Caballero. Springer, 2015. pp. 335-362 (Studies in Political Economy).

Bibtex

@inbook{1202671bfd154401b65c3618fd847cfc,
title = "Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems",
abstract = "This chapter presents a formal model of electoral competition where parties{\textquoteright} platforms are endogenously chosen and depend on the degree of the electoral rule disproportionality. We first show that proportional electoral systems generate centrifugal forces that increase candidate differentiation. This in turn implies that more proportional systems are associated with lower levels of abstention from indifference. This two-step theoretical prediction of the effect of electoral systems on turnout is then empirically validated even when we jointly control for the prevailing pivotality and party-system size hypotheses. Thus, our work highlights an additional link in the proportionality-turnout nexus.",
author = "Konstantinos Matakos and Orestis Troumpounis and Dimitrios Xefteris",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_18",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319155500",
series = "Studies in Political Economy",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "335--362",
editor = "Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero",
booktitle = "The political economy of governance",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems

AU - Matakos, Konstantinos

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - This chapter presents a formal model of electoral competition where parties’ platforms are endogenously chosen and depend on the degree of the electoral rule disproportionality. We first show that proportional electoral systems generate centrifugal forces that increase candidate differentiation. This in turn implies that more proportional systems are associated with lower levels of abstention from indifference. This two-step theoretical prediction of the effect of electoral systems on turnout is then empirically validated even when we jointly control for the prevailing pivotality and party-system size hypotheses. Thus, our work highlights an additional link in the proportionality-turnout nexus.

AB - This chapter presents a formal model of electoral competition where parties’ platforms are endogenously chosen and depend on the degree of the electoral rule disproportionality. We first show that proportional electoral systems generate centrifugal forces that increase candidate differentiation. This in turn implies that more proportional systems are associated with lower levels of abstention from indifference. This two-step theoretical prediction of the effect of electoral systems on turnout is then empirically validated even when we jointly control for the prevailing pivotality and party-system size hypotheses. Thus, our work highlights an additional link in the proportionality-turnout nexus.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_18

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_18

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9783319155500

T3 - Studies in Political Economy

SP - 335

EP - 362

BT - The political economy of governance

A2 - Schofield, Norman

A2 - Caballero, Gonzalo

PB - Springer

ER -