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Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting: Evidence from China

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Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting: Evidence from China. / Noureldeen, Emad; Elsayed, Mohamed; A. Elamer, Ahmed et al.
In: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 08.03.2024.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal article

Harvard

Noureldeen, E, Elsayed, M, A. Elamer, A & Ye, J 2024, 'Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting: Evidence from China', Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-024-01256-6

APA

Noureldeen, E., Elsayed, M., A. Elamer, A., & Ye, J. (2024). Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting: Evidence from China. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-024-01256-6

Vancouver

Noureldeen E, Elsayed M, A. Elamer A, Ye J. Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting: Evidence from China. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. 2024 Mar 8. Epub 2024 Mar 8. doi: 10.1007/s11156-024-01256-6

Author

Noureldeen, Emad ; Elsayed, Mohamed ; A. Elamer, Ahmed et al. / Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting : Evidence from China. In: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. 2024.

Bibtex

@article{fce82edcde4647e2b0e666f5cd9dd022,
title = "Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting: Evidence from China",
abstract = "This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of the two-tier board structure (board of directors and supervisory board) and the disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) in the expanded audit report. Using a sample of 10,857 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms spanning the 2017-2020 period, we offer two main results. First, with regard to the board of directors, we find that the auditor discloses a greater number and lengthier content of KAMs when there is a CEO duality and the board meetings are more frequent. Second, conversely, we find that the size and independence of the supervisory board are related to a lower number and length of KAMs disclosure. When we distinguish between account-level KAMs and entity-level KAMs, our further analysis shows that our results are principally associated with account-level KAMs rather than entity-level KAMs. Specifically, we find that CEO duality and the frequency of board of directors meetings are positively related to account-level KAMs. We also find that the size and independence of the supervisory board are negatively related to account-level KAMs. Our further analysis also shows evidence that these two-tier board structure characteristics are associated with the tone of KAMs disclosure in a consistent fashion. Our findings are robust and address endogeneity problems. Overall, our results suggest that the characteristics of the two-tier board structure drive KAMs disclosure, which should be of interest to regulatory bodies, policymakers, auditors, multinational firms, and users of financial reports.",
author = "Emad Noureldeen and Mohamed Elsayed and {A. Elamer}, Ahmed and Jianming Ye",
year = "2024",
month = mar,
day = "8",
doi = "10.1007/s11156-024-01256-6",
language = "English",
journal = "Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting",
issn = "0924-865X",
publisher = "Springer New York",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Two-tier board characteristics and expanded audit reporting

T2 - Evidence from China

AU - Noureldeen, Emad

AU - Elsayed, Mohamed

AU - A. Elamer, Ahmed

AU - Ye, Jianming

PY - 2024/3/8

Y1 - 2024/3/8

N2 - This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of the two-tier board structure (board of directors and supervisory board) and the disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) in the expanded audit report. Using a sample of 10,857 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms spanning the 2017-2020 period, we offer two main results. First, with regard to the board of directors, we find that the auditor discloses a greater number and lengthier content of KAMs when there is a CEO duality and the board meetings are more frequent. Second, conversely, we find that the size and independence of the supervisory board are related to a lower number and length of KAMs disclosure. When we distinguish between account-level KAMs and entity-level KAMs, our further analysis shows that our results are principally associated with account-level KAMs rather than entity-level KAMs. Specifically, we find that CEO duality and the frequency of board of directors meetings are positively related to account-level KAMs. We also find that the size and independence of the supervisory board are negatively related to account-level KAMs. Our further analysis also shows evidence that these two-tier board structure characteristics are associated with the tone of KAMs disclosure in a consistent fashion. Our findings are robust and address endogeneity problems. Overall, our results suggest that the characteristics of the two-tier board structure drive KAMs disclosure, which should be of interest to regulatory bodies, policymakers, auditors, multinational firms, and users of financial reports.

AB - This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of the two-tier board structure (board of directors and supervisory board) and the disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) in the expanded audit report. Using a sample of 10,857 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms spanning the 2017-2020 period, we offer two main results. First, with regard to the board of directors, we find that the auditor discloses a greater number and lengthier content of KAMs when there is a CEO duality and the board meetings are more frequent. Second, conversely, we find that the size and independence of the supervisory board are related to a lower number and length of KAMs disclosure. When we distinguish between account-level KAMs and entity-level KAMs, our further analysis shows that our results are principally associated with account-level KAMs rather than entity-level KAMs. Specifically, we find that CEO duality and the frequency of board of directors meetings are positively related to account-level KAMs. We also find that the size and independence of the supervisory board are negatively related to account-level KAMs. Our further analysis also shows evidence that these two-tier board structure characteristics are associated with the tone of KAMs disclosure in a consistent fashion. Our findings are robust and address endogeneity problems. Overall, our results suggest that the characteristics of the two-tier board structure drive KAMs disclosure, which should be of interest to regulatory bodies, policymakers, auditors, multinational firms, and users of financial reports.

U2 - 10.1007/s11156-024-01256-6

DO - 10.1007/s11156-024-01256-6

M3 - Journal article

JO - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

JF - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

SN - 0924-865X

ER -