TY - JOUR

T1 - ‘Uncontested’ view of Shi’i networks

T2 - A reply to Corboz

AU - Nasirzadeh, S.

PY - 2019/11/30

Y1 - 2019/11/30

N2 -  The starting point for Corboz’s article ‘Shi’i Clerical Networks and the Transnational Contest over Sacred Authority by challenging assumptions that velayat-e faqih is an ‘uncontested’ position: Dynamics in London’s Shi’i Triangle’ is a proposal that gives emphasis to a transnational contest between maraji’ and the Iranian Supreme Leader over sacred authority. Corboz’s core argument seeks to undermine the view of the velayat-e faqih being the only relevant ‘model’ of clerical authority in today and future Shi’i worlds by exploring Shi’a networks in London. In response, I argue that the political and religious authority of velayat-e faqih cannot be contested with the religious functionality of marja’iyya in Shi’ism. Second, the notion of a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ as well as the accusation that Iran is orchestratings the Shi’a groups – via which the authoritarian regimes ensured their survival during the Arab Springs – should be rejected by accepting that even the most pro-Iranian groups do not necessarily tend to repeat the Iranian model of leadership. Finally, I emphasise that challenging the power to rule as a feature of velayat-e faqih by holding Iran’s Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran with marja’iyya does not provide an adequate understanding of the multidimensional dynamics of Shi’ism.

AB -  The starting point for Corboz’s article ‘Shi’i Clerical Networks and the Transnational Contest over Sacred Authority by challenging assumptions that velayat-e faqih is an ‘uncontested’ position: Dynamics in London’s Shi’i Triangle’ is a proposal that gives emphasis to a transnational contest between maraji’ and the Iranian Supreme Leader over sacred authority. Corboz’s core argument seeks to undermine the view of the velayat-e faqih being the only relevant ‘model’ of clerical authority in today and future Shi’i worlds by exploring Shi’a networks in London. In response, I argue that the political and religious authority of velayat-e faqih cannot be contested with the religious functionality of marja’iyya in Shi’ism. Second, the notion of a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ as well as the accusation that Iran is orchestratings the Shi’a groups – via which the authoritarian regimes ensured their survival during the Arab Springs – should be rejected by accepting that even the most pro-Iranian groups do not necessarily tend to repeat the Iranian model of leadership. Finally, I emphasise that challenging the power to rule as a feature of velayat-e faqih by holding Iran’s Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran with marja’iyya does not provide an adequate understanding of the multidimensional dynamics of Shi’ism.

KW - Shi’a networks

KW - velayat-e faqih

KW - Marja’iyya

KW - Ayatollah Khamenei

KW - Ayatollah Sistani

U2 - 10.1332/204378919X15718900395757

DO - 10.1332/204378919X15718900395757

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 741

EP - 744

JO - Global Discourse

JF - Global Discourse

SN - 2326-9995

IS - 4

ER -