Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Sayer, A. (2017), Values within Reason. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie, 54: 468-475. doi:10.1111/cars.12172 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cars.12172/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Values within reason
AU - Sayer, Richard Andrew
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Sayer, A. (2017), Values within Reason. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie, 54: 468-475. doi:10.1111/cars.12172 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cars.12172/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2017/11/30
Y1 - 2017/11/30
N2 - The paper questions the assumptions that facts and values are always radically different, that objectivity and values do not mix, and that values are subjective and a-rational and should be excluded from social science. It argues (1) that such assumptions are underpinned by unnoticed slippages between different meanings of objectivity and by misunderstandings of the nature of values and normativity; (2) that evaluative judgements—often in the form of “thick ethical concepts” inwhich description and evaluation are fused—are necessary for objective description in social science; and (3) that framing the values issue in terms of the relations between is and ought misrepresents the place of normativity in social science and in everyday life.
AB - The paper questions the assumptions that facts and values are always radically different, that objectivity and values do not mix, and that values are subjective and a-rational and should be excluded from social science. It argues (1) that such assumptions are underpinned by unnoticed slippages between different meanings of objectivity and by misunderstandings of the nature of values and normativity; (2) that evaluative judgements—often in the form of “thick ethical concepts” inwhich description and evaluation are fused—are necessary for objective description in social science; and (3) that framing the values issue in terms of the relations between is and ought misrepresents the place of normativity in social science and in everyday life.
KW - values
KW - reason
KW - normativity
KW - thick ethical terms
U2 - 10.1111/cars.12172
DO - 10.1111/cars.12172
M3 - Journal article
VL - 54
SP - 468
EP - 475
JO - Canadian Review of Sociology
JF - Canadian Review of Sociology
SN - 1755-6171
IS - 4
ER -