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Veto power in committees: an experimental study

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Veto power in committees: an experimental study. / Kagel, J.H.; Sung, H.; Winter, E.
In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2, 06.2010, p. 167-188.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Kagel, JH, Sung, H & Winter, E 2010, 'Veto power in committees: an experimental study', Experimental Economics, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 167-188. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8

APA

Kagel, J. H., Sung, H., & Winter, E. (2010). Veto power in committees: an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 13(2), 167-188. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8

Vancouver

Kagel JH, Sung H, Winter E. Veto power in committees: an experimental study. Experimental Economics. 2010 Jun;13(2):167-188. doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8

Author

Kagel, J.H. ; Sung, H. ; Winter, E. / Veto power in committees : an experimental study. In: Experimental Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 13, No. 2. pp. 167-188.

Bibtex

@article{2f5e9e7759fb4cd8936cebb97daf421d,
title = "Veto power in committees: an experimental study",
abstract = "Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. {\textcopyright} Economic Science Association 2010.",
keywords = "Bargaining, Committees, Veto power",
author = "J.H. Kagel and H. Sung and E. Winter",
year = "2010",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "167--188",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Veto power in committees

T2 - an experimental study

AU - Kagel, J.H.

AU - Sung, H.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2010/6

Y1 - 2010/6

N2 - Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. © Economic Science Association 2010.

AB - Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. © Economic Science Association 2010.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Committees

KW - Veto power

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8

DO - 10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8

M3 - Journal article

VL - 13

SP - 167

EP - 188

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

SN - 1386-4157

IS - 2

ER -