Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutu...

Electronic data

  • MS_20190626.R3_manuscript

    Accepted author manuscript, 538 KB, PDF document

    Embargo ends: 3/05/24

    Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit. / Isoni, Andrea; Sugden, Robert; Zheng, Jiwei.
In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 131, No. 6, 30.06.2023, p. 1576-1616.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Isoni, A, Sugden, R & Zheng, J 2023, 'Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 131, no. 6, pp. 1576-1616. https://doi.org/10.1086/722930

APA

Isoni, A., Sugden, R., & Zheng, J. (2023). Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit. Journal of Political Economy, 131(6), 1576-1616. https://doi.org/10.1086/722930

Vancouver

Isoni A, Sugden R, Zheng J. Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit. Journal of Political Economy. 2023 Jun 30;131(6):1576-1616. Epub 2023 May 3. doi: 10.1086/722930

Author

Isoni, Andrea ; Sugden, Robert ; Zheng, Jiwei. / Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit. In: Journal of Political Economy. 2023 ; Vol. 131, No. 6. pp. 1576-1616.

Bibtex

@article{9d7b99006907448e8c584365d231eb61,
title = "Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit",
abstract = "Most social preference theories are based on observations of nonvoluntary interactions. Nonselfish behavior may take fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We investigate the “Principle of Mutual Benefit”—an injunctive norm requiring individuals who enter interactions voluntarily to conform to common expectations about behavior within them. This norm induces patterns of behavior inconsistent with existing social preference theories and allows extrinsic incentives to crowd in trustworthiness. We embed this norm in a model consistent with evidence about promise keeping, gift exchange, and “avoiding the ask.” We present new experimental evidence that people adhere to it.",
keywords = "voluntary interaction, Principle of Mutual Benefit, social norm, crowding in, non-selfish behaviour",
author = "Andrea Isoni and Robert Sugden and Jiwei Zheng",
year = "2023",
month = jun,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1086/722930",
language = "English",
volume = "131",
pages = "1576--1616",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit

AU - Isoni, Andrea

AU - Sugden, Robert

AU - Zheng, Jiwei

PY - 2023/6/30

Y1 - 2023/6/30

N2 - Most social preference theories are based on observations of nonvoluntary interactions. Nonselfish behavior may take fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We investigate the “Principle of Mutual Benefit”—an injunctive norm requiring individuals who enter interactions voluntarily to conform to common expectations about behavior within them. This norm induces patterns of behavior inconsistent with existing social preference theories and allows extrinsic incentives to crowd in trustworthiness. We embed this norm in a model consistent with evidence about promise keeping, gift exchange, and “avoiding the ask.” We present new experimental evidence that people adhere to it.

AB - Most social preference theories are based on observations of nonvoluntary interactions. Nonselfish behavior may take fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We investigate the “Principle of Mutual Benefit”—an injunctive norm requiring individuals who enter interactions voluntarily to conform to common expectations about behavior within them. This norm induces patterns of behavior inconsistent with existing social preference theories and allows extrinsic incentives to crowd in trustworthiness. We embed this norm in a model consistent with evidence about promise keeping, gift exchange, and “avoiding the ask.” We present new experimental evidence that people adhere to it.

KW - voluntary interaction

KW - Principle of Mutual Benefit

KW - social norm

KW - crowding in

KW - non-selfish behaviour

U2 - 10.1086/722930

DO - 10.1086/722930

M3 - Journal article

VL - 131

SP - 1576

EP - 1616

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0022-3808

IS - 6

ER -