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When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate. / Roy, Jaideep.
In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 09.2007, p. 461-476.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Roy, J 2007, 'When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate', International Game Theory Review, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 461-476. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001539

APA

Roy, J. (2007). When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate. International Game Theory Review, 9(3), 461-476. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001539

Vancouver

Roy J. When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate. International Game Theory Review. 2007 Sept;9(3):461-476. doi: 10.1142/S0219198907001539

Author

Roy, Jaideep. / When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate. In: International Game Theory Review. 2007 ; Vol. 9, No. 3. pp. 461-476.

Bibtex

@article{e8b0636630a644d9940236fdd344ecbe,
title = "When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate",
abstract = "The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behavior is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.",
keywords = "Coordination, evolution of aspiration , myopic optimization",
author = "Jaideep Roy",
year = "2007",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1142/S0219198907001539",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "461--476",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate

AU - Roy, Jaideep

PY - 2007/9

Y1 - 2007/9

N2 - The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behavior is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.

AB - The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behavior is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.

KW - Coordination

KW - evolution of aspiration

KW - myopic optimization

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198907001539

DO - 10.1142/S0219198907001539

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 461

EP - 476

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 3

ER -