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When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Forthcoming

Standard

When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players. / Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud; Jalloul, Maya.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 18.06.2025.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bouacida, E, Foucart, R & Jalloul, M 2025, 'When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

APA

Bouacida, E., Foucart, R., & Jalloul, M. (in press). When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

Vancouver

Bouacida E, Foucart R, Jalloul M. When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2025 Jun 18.

Author

Bouacida, Elias ; Foucart, Renaud ; Jalloul, Maya. / When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap : Experimental Evidence from Chess Players. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2025.

Bibtex

@article{298180a146f6495e9138d9ab8ad9a1b3,
title = "When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players",
abstract = "We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chessplayers. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past gamesand allowed them to revise their evaluation after observing the answers of a higheror a lower-ability adviser. Although high-quality advice has the potential to serveas a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between higher- and lower-abilityplayers, it did not happen in our experiment. One reason is that lower-abilityplayers tend to pay a higher premium by sticking to their initial evaluation ratherthan following high-quality advice.",
author = "Elias Bouacida and Renaud Foucart and Maya Jalloul",
year = "2025",
month = jun,
day = "18",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap

T2 - Experimental Evidence from Chess Players

AU - Bouacida, Elias

AU - Foucart, Renaud

AU - Jalloul, Maya

PY - 2025/6/18

Y1 - 2025/6/18

N2 - We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chessplayers. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past gamesand allowed them to revise their evaluation after observing the answers of a higheror a lower-ability adviser. Although high-quality advice has the potential to serveas a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between higher- and lower-abilityplayers, it did not happen in our experiment. One reason is that lower-abilityplayers tend to pay a higher premium by sticking to their initial evaluation ratherthan following high-quality advice.

AB - We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chessplayers. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past gamesand allowed them to revise their evaluation after observing the answers of a higheror a lower-ability adviser. Although high-quality advice has the potential to serveas a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between higher- and lower-abilityplayers, it did not happen in our experiment. One reason is that lower-abilityplayers tend to pay a higher premium by sticking to their initial evaluation ratherthan following high-quality advice.

M3 - Journal article

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -