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When the cat is near, the mice won't play: the effect of external examiners in Italian schools

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When the cat is near, the mice won't play : the effect of external examiners in Italian schools. / Bertoni, Marco; Brunello, Giorgio; Rocco, Lorenzo.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 104, 08.2013, p. 65-77.

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Bertoni, Marco ; Brunello, Giorgio ; Rocco, Lorenzo. / When the cat is near, the mice won't play : the effect of external examiners in Italian schools. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 104. pp. 65-77.

Bibtex

@article{dd303f05bdd646cd80b10cc7585ddd28,
title = "When the cat is near, the mice won't play: the effect of external examiners in Italian schools",
abstract = "We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner has both a direct and an indirect negative effect on the performance of monitored classes in standardised educational tests. The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between classes of the same school with and without external examiners. The indirect effect is the difference in performance between un-monitored classes in schools with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools without external monitoring. We find that the overall effect of having an external examiner in the class is to reduce the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.5% – depending on the grade and the test – with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. The direct and indirect effects range between 4.3 and 6.6% and between 1.2 and 1.9% respectively. Using additional supporting evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on measured test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the negative effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class.",
keywords = "Education, Testing , External monitoring , Indirect treatment effects",
author = "Marco Bertoni and Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco",
year = "2013",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.010",
language = "English",
volume = "104",
pages = "65--77",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - When the cat is near, the mice won't play

T2 - the effect of external examiners in Italian schools

AU - Bertoni, Marco

AU - Brunello, Giorgio

AU - Rocco, Lorenzo

PY - 2013/8

Y1 - 2013/8

N2 - We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner has both a direct and an indirect negative effect on the performance of monitored classes in standardised educational tests. The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between classes of the same school with and without external examiners. The indirect effect is the difference in performance between un-monitored classes in schools with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools without external monitoring. We find that the overall effect of having an external examiner in the class is to reduce the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.5% – depending on the grade and the test – with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. The direct and indirect effects range between 4.3 and 6.6% and between 1.2 and 1.9% respectively. Using additional supporting evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on measured test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the negative effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class.

AB - We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner has both a direct and an indirect negative effect on the performance of monitored classes in standardised educational tests. The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between classes of the same school with and without external examiners. The indirect effect is the difference in performance between un-monitored classes in schools with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools without external monitoring. We find that the overall effect of having an external examiner in the class is to reduce the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.5% – depending on the grade and the test – with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. The direct and indirect effects range between 4.3 and 6.6% and between 1.2 and 1.9% respectively. Using additional supporting evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on measured test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the negative effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class.

KW - Education

KW - Testing

KW - External monitoring

KW - Indirect treatment effects

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 104

SP - 65

EP - 77

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

ER -