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Why "consciousness" means what it does.

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Why "consciousness" means what it does. / Manson, Neil C.
In: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 42, No. 1-2, 01.2011, p. 98-117.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal article

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Manson NC. Why "consciousness" means what it does. Metaphilosophy. 2011 Jan;42(1-2):98-117. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01681.x

Author

Manson, Neil C. / Why "consciousness" means what it does. In: Metaphilosophy. 2011 ; Vol. 42, No. 1-2. pp. 98-117.

Bibtex

@article{ffd85f6c8ada4c01852ec0720995eb79,
title = "Why {"}consciousness{"} means what it does.",
abstract = "“Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist account then we are less likely to subject our thought and talk about the mind to the kind of critical analysis that it needs. The exploration of the semantics of “consciousness” offered here, by way of contrast, clarifies and fine-tunes our thought and talk about consciousness and conscious mentality and explains why “consciousness” means what it does, and why it means a number of different, but related, things.",
keywords = "* concept of consciousness, * consciousness, * theories of consciousness, * history of psychology, * unconscious mind, * state consciousness",
author = "Manson, {Neil C.}",
note = "this is a draft - for the published version with correct pagination see the Metaphilosophy link above.",
year = "2011",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01681.x",
language = "English",
volume = "42",
pages = "98--117",
journal = "Metaphilosophy",
issn = "0026-1068",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why "consciousness" means what it does.

AU - Manson, Neil C.

N1 - this is a draft - for the published version with correct pagination see the Metaphilosophy link above.

PY - 2011/1

Y1 - 2011/1

N2 - “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist account then we are less likely to subject our thought and talk about the mind to the kind of critical analysis that it needs. The exploration of the semantics of “consciousness” offered here, by way of contrast, clarifies and fine-tunes our thought and talk about consciousness and conscious mentality and explains why “consciousness” means what it does, and why it means a number of different, but related, things.

AB - “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist account then we are less likely to subject our thought and talk about the mind to the kind of critical analysis that it needs. The exploration of the semantics of “consciousness” offered here, by way of contrast, clarifies and fine-tunes our thought and talk about consciousness and conscious mentality and explains why “consciousness” means what it does, and why it means a number of different, but related, things.

KW - concept of consciousness

KW - consciousness

KW - theories of consciousness

KW - history of psychology

KW - unconscious mind

KW - state consciousness

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01681.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01681.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 42

SP - 98

EP - 117

JO - Metaphilosophy

JF - Metaphilosophy

SN - 0026-1068

IS - 1-2

ER -