Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Accounting Forum. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Accounting Forum, 39, 4 2015 DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?
AU - Chircop, Justin
AU - Kiosse, Paraskevi
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Accounting Forum. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Accounting Forum, 39, 4 2015 DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002
PY - 2015/12/11
Y1 - 2015/12/11
N2 - We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparers position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.
AB - We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparers position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.
U2 - 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002
DO - 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002
M3 - Journal article
VL - 39
SP - 268
EP - 280
JO - Accounting Forum
JF - Accounting Forum
SN - 0155-9982
IS - 4
ER -