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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Accounting Forum. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Accounting Forum, 39, 4 2015 DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002

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Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?

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Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals? / Chircop, Justin; Kiosse, Paraskevi.

In: Accounting Forum, Vol. 39, No. 4, 11.12.2015, p. 268-280.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Chircop, Justin ; Kiosse, Paraskevi. / Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?. In: Accounting Forum. 2015 ; Vol. 39, No. 4. pp. 268-280.

Bibtex

@article{15d2fe2bc62949a8824c17a2222d7b80,
title = "Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?",
abstract = "We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparers position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.",
author = "Justin Chircop and Paraskevi Kiosse",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Accounting Forum. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Accounting Forum, 39, 4 2015 DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
day = "11",
doi = "10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002",
language = "English",
volume = "39",
pages = "268--280",
journal = "Accounting Forum",
issn = "0155-9982",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?

AU - Chircop, Justin

AU - Kiosse, Paraskevi

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Accounting Forum. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Accounting Forum, 39, 4 2015 DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002

PY - 2015/12/11

Y1 - 2015/12/11

N2 - We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparers position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.

AB - We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparers position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.

U2 - 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002

DO - 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 39

SP - 268

EP - 280

JO - Accounting Forum

JF - Accounting Forum

SN - 0155-9982

IS - 4

ER -