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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Why does temporary work increase disability insurance inflow?
AU - Koning, Pierre
AU - Muller, Paul
AU - Prudon, Roger
PY - 2025/6/4
Y1 - 2025/6/4
N2 - We show that workers with fixed-term contracts are substantially more likely to apply for and be awarded disability insurance (DI) benefits than permanent workers. We study whether this differential can be explained by (i) selection of worker types into contracts, (ii) the relation between contract type and the risk of illness, (iii) differences in employer support during illness, and (iv) differences in labour market prospects of ill workers. We find that selection actually masks part of the differential, whereas the impact of contract type on health is limited. In contrast, the difference in employer support during illness is a significant cause of the heightened DI risk of temporary workers, especially in slack labour markets. We therefore conclude that, conditional on being ill, workers with fixed-term contracts face different support structures and incentives that make them more likely to ultimately apply for and be awarded DI.
AB - We show that workers with fixed-term contracts are substantially more likely to apply for and be awarded disability insurance (DI) benefits than permanent workers. We study whether this differential can be explained by (i) selection of worker types into contracts, (ii) the relation between contract type and the risk of illness, (iii) differences in employer support during illness, and (iv) differences in labour market prospects of ill workers. We find that selection actually masks part of the differential, whereas the impact of contract type on health is limited. In contrast, the difference in employer support during illness is a significant cause of the heightened DI risk of temporary workers, especially in slack labour markets. We therefore conclude that, conditional on being ill, workers with fixed-term contracts face different support structures and incentives that make them more likely to ultimately apply for and be awarded DI.
U2 - 10.1016/j.labeco.2025.102719
DO - 10.1016/j.labeco.2025.102719
M3 - Journal article
VL - 96
JO - Labour Economics
JF - Labour Economics
SN - 0927-5371
M1 - 102719
ER -