TY - JOUR

T1 - Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

AU - Quaye, Jeremy D.

AU - Ball, Linden J.

PY - 2000/11

Y1 - 2000/11

N2 - Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form.This paper presents amental models-based account,which explains these ®ndings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types.We propose that belief bias may re¯ect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one’s processing Ðattributable to working-memory overloadÐ is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in con®dence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments,with participants being more con®dent in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic ®gure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the ®gural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants’ articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between high and low spatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.

AB - Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form.This paper presents amental models-based account,which explains these ®ndings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types.We propose that belief bias may re¯ect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one’s processing Ðattributable to working-memory overloadÐ is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in con®dence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments,with participants being more con®dent in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic ®gure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the ®gural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants’ articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between high and low spatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 53A

SP - 1202

EP - 1223

JO - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Series a Human Experimental Psychology

JF - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Series a Human Experimental Psychology

SN - 0272-4987

IS - 4

ER -