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A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>10/2002
<mark>Journal</mark>Social Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
Volume19
Number of pages13
Pages (from-to)811-823
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.