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A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

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A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. / Dagan, N.; Volij, O.; Winter, E.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 19, No. 4, 10.2002, p. 811-823.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Dagan, N, Volij, O & Winter, E 2002, 'A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 811-823. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200159

APA

Dagan, N., Volij, O., & Winter, E. (2002). A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(4), 811-823. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200159

Vancouver

Dagan N, Volij O, Winter E. A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 2002 Oct;19(4):811-823. doi: 10.1007/s003550200159

Author

Dagan, N. ; Volij, O. ; Winter, E. / A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 2002 ; Vol. 19, No. 4. pp. 811-823.

Bibtex

@article{5d15e6b96f8e4e5aae1b1c8ca80854a9,
title = "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution",
abstract = "We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.",
keywords = "Disagreement Point, Bargaining Solution , Rational Alternative , Nash Bargaining Solution , Irrelevant Alternative ",
author = "N. Dagan and O. Volij and E. Winter",
year = "2002",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1007/s003550200159",
language = "English",
volume = "19",
pages = "811--823",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "0176-1714",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

AU - Dagan, N.

AU - Volij, O.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2002/10

Y1 - 2002/10

N2 - We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

AB - We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

KW - Disagreement Point

KW - Bargaining Solution

KW - Rational Alternative

KW - Nash Bargaining Solution

KW - Irrelevant Alternative

U2 - 10.1007/s003550200159

DO - 10.1007/s003550200159

M3 - Journal article

VL - 19

SP - 811

EP - 823

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

IS - 4

ER -