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A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>08/2002
<mark>Journal</mark>Theory and Decision
Issue number1
Volume53
Number of pages28
Pages (from-to)1-28
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.