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A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core

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A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. / Okada, A.; Winter, E.
In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 53, No. 1, 08.2002, p. 1-28.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Okada, A & Winter, E 2002, 'A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core', Theory and Decision, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020811218051

APA

Okada, A., & Winter, E. (2002). A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. Theory and Decision, 53(1), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020811218051

Vancouver

Okada A, Winter E. A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. Theory and Decision. 2002 Aug;53(1):1-28. doi: 10.1023/A:1020811218051

Author

Okada, A. ; Winter, E. / A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In: Theory and Decision. 2002 ; Vol. 53, No. 1. pp. 1-28.

Bibtex

@article{a762f57b18814ca4a29f0855aefd8240,
title = "A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core",
abstract = "We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.",
keywords = "Core, Game equilibrium, Multilateral bargaining, Non-cooperative axiomatization, Decision theory, Economics, Mathematical models, Set theory, Theorem proving, Game theory",
author = "A. Okada and E. Winter",
year = "2002",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1023/A:1020811218051",
language = "English",
volume = "53",
pages = "1--28",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core

AU - Okada, A.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2002/8

Y1 - 2002/8

N2 - We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.

AB - We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.

KW - Core

KW - Game equilibrium

KW - Multilateral bargaining

KW - Non-cooperative axiomatization

KW - Decision theory

KW - Economics

KW - Mathematical models

KW - Set theory

KW - Theorem proving

KW - Game theory

U2 - 10.1023/A:1020811218051

DO - 10.1023/A:1020811218051

M3 - Journal article

VL - 53

SP - 1

EP - 28

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 1

ER -