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A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>06/1989
<mark>Journal</mark>International Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
Number of pages14
Pages (from-to)227-240
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. © 1989 Physica-Verlag.