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A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation. / Winter, E.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2, 06.1989, p. 227-240.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 1989, 'A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 227-240. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01268161

APA

Winter, E. (1989). A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation. International Journal of Game Theory, 18(2), 227-240. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01268161

Vancouver

Winter E. A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation. International Journal of Game Theory. 1989 Jun;18(2):227-240. doi: 10.1007/BF01268161

Author

Winter, E. / A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 1989 ; Vol. 18, No. 2. pp. 227-240.

Bibtex

@article{e10d12cfdb98471ebf11688f1aca3a80,
title = "A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation",
abstract = "This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called {"}Levels Structure{"}) contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. {\textcopyright} 1989 Physica-Verlag.",
keywords = "Coalitions, Cooperations, Shapley value",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "1989",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1007/BF01268161",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "227--240",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1989/6

Y1 - 1989/6

N2 - This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. © 1989 Physica-Verlag.

AB - This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. © 1989 Physica-Verlag.

KW - Coalitions

KW - Cooperations

KW - Shapley value

U2 - 10.1007/BF01268161

DO - 10.1007/BF01268161

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 227

EP - 240

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 2

ER -