Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - A Value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
AU - Winter, E.
PY - 1989/6
Y1 - 1989/6
N2 - This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. © 1989 Physica-Verlag.
AB - This paper develops a value for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is priorly given. This cooperation description (called "Levels Structure") contains a sequence of levels of cooperative agreements, each represented by a coalition structure. The value developed is shown to be an extension of some well known values such as the Shapley value (1959), Aumann and Dreze' extension of Shapley value (1974) and Owen's value for prior coalition structure (1977). In the second section some properties of the value are discussed. © 1989 Physica-Verlag.
KW - Coalitions
KW - Cooperations
KW - Shapley value
U2 - 10.1007/BF01268161
DO - 10.1007/BF01268161
M3 - Journal article
VL - 18
SP - 227
EP - 240
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
SN - 0020-7276
IS - 2
ER -