Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public...

Electronic data


Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>04/2012
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Issue number4
Number of pages15
Pages (from-to)642-656
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.