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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game
AU - Matros, Alexander
PY - 2012/4
Y1 - 2012/4
N2 - This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.
AB - This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.
KW - Public good
KW - Imitation
KW - Best reply
KW - Decision rules
U2 - 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004
M3 - Journal article
VL - 36
SP - 642
EP - 656
JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
SN - 0165-1889
IS - 4
ER -