Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public...

Electronic data

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game. / Matros, Alexander.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 36, No. 4, 04.2012, p. 642-656.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Matros, A 2012, 'Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 642-656. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004

APA

Vancouver

Author

Matros, Alexander. / Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 2012 ; Vol. 36, No. 4. pp. 642-656.

Bibtex

@article{8a2e310e36154f43a4be5ca0e9c43554,
title = "Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game",
abstract = "This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large. ",
keywords = "Public good, Imitation , Best reply , Decision rules",
author = "Alexander Matros",
year = "2012",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "642--656",
journal = "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control",
issn = "0165-1889",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game

AU - Matros, Alexander

PY - 2012/4

Y1 - 2012/4

N2 - This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.

AB - This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.

KW - Public good

KW - Imitation

KW - Best reply

KW - Decision rules

U2 - 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 36

SP - 642

EP - 656

JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

SN - 0165-1889

IS - 4

ER -