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An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>31/05/2020
<mark>Journal</mark>Operations Research Letters
Issue number3
Volume48
Number of pages5
Pages (from-to)304-308
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date14/04/20
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter, for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. This is repeated for the case where customers are heterogeneous. The mechanisms are based on the fact that once some customers get priority, its value of the other gets even higher.

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Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier B.V.