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An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue

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An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue. / Haviv, Moshe; Winter, Eyal.
In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 48, No. 3, 31.05.2020, p. 304-308.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Haviv, M & Winter, E 2020, 'An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue', Operations Research Letters, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 304-308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.010

APA

Haviv, M., & Winter, E. (2020). An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue. Operations Research Letters, 48(3), 304-308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.010

Vancouver

Haviv M, Winter E. An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue. Operations Research Letters. 2020 May 31;48(3):304-308. Epub 2020 Apr 14. doi: 10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.010

Author

Haviv, Moshe ; Winter, Eyal. / An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue. In: Operations Research Letters. 2020 ; Vol. 48, No. 3. pp. 304-308.

Bibtex

@article{6ccdd92b8a1f4cf792896c232d788eb1,
title = "An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue",
abstract = "We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter, for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. This is repeated for the case where customers are heterogeneous. The mechanisms are based on the fact that once some customers get priority, its value of the other gets even higher.",
keywords = "Charging mechanisms, Priorities, Queues",
author = "Moshe Haviv and Eyal Winter",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2020",
month = may,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.010",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "304--308",
journal = "Operations Research Letters",
issn = "0167-6377",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue

AU - Haviv, Moshe

AU - Winter, Eyal

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2020/5/31

Y1 - 2020/5/31

N2 - We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter, for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. This is repeated for the case where customers are heterogeneous. The mechanisms are based on the fact that once some customers get priority, its value of the other gets even higher.

AB - We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter, for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. This is repeated for the case where customers are heterogeneous. The mechanisms are based on the fact that once some customers get priority, its value of the other gets even higher.

KW - Charging mechanisms

KW - Priorities

KW - Queues

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.010

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.010

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85083038108

VL - 48

SP - 304

EP - 308

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

SN - 0167-6377

IS - 3

ER -